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ABSTRACT 
Ukraine has a résumé of achievements in its relations with NATO since 1991.  
However, at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the NATO Allies chose not to offer Ukraine a 
Membership Action Plan. This thesis examines Ukraine’s prospects for NATO 
membership, and investigates the hypothesis that Ukraine’s membership aspirations are 
most affected by two sets of independent variables – internal and external.  The two key 
internal variables that affect the prospects for Ukraine’s accession to NATO are public 
opinion and domestic politics. The majority of Ukrainian society opposes Ukraine 
becoming a member of NATO, while political discord within the Ukrainian government 
may also limit the likelihood of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.  The two main external 
variables affecting Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership are Russia and NATO 
itself.  Russia adamantly opposes NATO membership for Ukraine, and may apply 
economic, social or political pressure against Ukraine if its government continues to 
pursue membership against Russian wishes.  Regarding NATO, it appears that some 
Allies do not believe Ukraine is ready for membership, while others do not wish to 
provoke negative Russian reactions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
NATO-Ukraine relations formally began in 1991, when Ukraine became a 
founding member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which became the 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.   In 1994, Ukraine became the first 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member to join the NATO Partnership for 
Peace (PfP).1  As long ago as 1997, Tor Bukkvoll, a Norwegian scholar, wrote that 
“Ukraine is giving high priority to participation in the PfP program and is considered to 
be one of the most eager participants.”2 The Ukrainian military has participated in 
notable PfP operations such as: “Cooperative Osprey,” “The Shield of Peace,” 
“Cooperative Neighbor” and “Sea Breeze.”  Also, Ukrainian peacekeepers were active in 
the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations 
in Bosnia, and Ukrainian troops are participating in the NATO-led Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) operation.   
The relationship between NATO and Ukraine was strengthened through the 
“Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine,” signed in 1997.  
Furthermore, a “NATO-Ukraine Action Plan” was adopted in 2002, and an “Intensified 
Dialogue” on membership was launched in 2005.  The current Ukrainian government is 
actively pursuing a “Membership Action Plan” (MAP), and has stated that NATO 
membership is one of its goals. 
Despite this résumé of achievements and the membership aspirations of the 
current Ukrainian government, it may be several years before Ukraine is admitted into the 
Atlantic Alliance.  Despite the Alliance’s statement in the April 2008 Bucharest Summit 
 
 
1 John Kriendler, Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs, Misconceptions and Urban 
Legends (Shrivenham, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United 
Kingdom, July 2007), 2.  Available from http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/csrc/document-
listings/cee/07(23)JK.pdf (accessed 12 January 2008).  
2 Tor Bukkvoll, “Ukraine and NATO: The Politics of Soft Cooperation,” Security Dialogue, vol. 28, 
no. 3, 1997, 364. 
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Declaration that Ukraine will eventually become a member of NATO, there is a 
possibility that membership will never be offered to Ukraine.  The objective of this thesis 
is to analyze the prospects for Ukraine’s membership in NATO. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This study investigates the hypothesis that the prospects for Ukraine’s 
membership in NATO (the dependent variable) will be affected by two sets of 
independent variables – internal and external.  The two internal variables that affect 
Ukraine’s NATO membership aspiration are public opinion and internal politics. The 
majority of Ukrainian society is against the idea of Ukraine becoming a member of 
NATO.  As James Sherr, a British expert, wrote in 2006, “The public’s changing mood 
on NATO has been carefully followed by Ukrainian media and think tanks, with the 
latest research showing that both ambivalence and curiosity regarding the organization 
are on the rise.  However, half of Ukrainians still oppose membership whereas, 
depending on the survey, only up to 30 percent would approve of it.”3  This is a key 
factor limiting the likelihood of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.  Some experts consider 
the possibility of social unrest to be a serious threat to Ukraine today.  Offering NATO 
membership to Ukraine, without public approval, could lead to protests.  There are 
several reasons for the anti-NATO opinion polls in Ukraine, and they are discussed in 
this study.  The Ukrainian government has been taking action to educate Ukrainians on 
the positive aspects of NATO membership. 
The second internal variable is the Ukrainian political situation, which has been 
tumultuous since 1991.  Political discord within Ukrainian society is a factor limiting the 
likelihood of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.  Ukraine achieved independence from the 
Soviet Union in 1991, and its political structure and democratic institutions are still 
evolving.  Human rights controversies, economic setbacks, and rampant corruption have 
burdened Ukraine since the achievement of independence in 1991.  The 2007 
 
3 James Sherr, At the Crossroads or The Precipice? The Fate of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and its 
Implications for Europe (Shrivenham, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defense Academy of the 
United Kingdom, March 2006), 9.  Available from http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/csrc/document-
listings/cee/06 percent2814 percent29js.pdf (accessed 12 March 2008). 
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Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Ukraine 118 out of 179 
countries.4  Events in recent years, such as the Orange Revolution and the dissolution of 
Ukraine’s parliament, have demonstrated the instability of the political situation.  
However, Ukraine is showing signs of improvement in some areas. The Freedom House 
Nations in Transit annual study upgraded Ukraine to “free” in 2006.  Ukraine is the first 
CIS state to achieve this recognition.5  Further political reform will probably be 
necessary before Ukraine is offered membership i
The two main external variables affecting Ukraine’s prospects for NATO 
membership are Russia and NATO itself.  The Russian Federation is another factor 
limiting the prospects for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, because Russia and Ukraine 
are closely linked.  As Anatol Lieven has observed, “These links have not just been 
forged over the centuries by Russian, then Soviet, governments but have also developed 
‘organically’ through millions of human contacts over hundreds of years, resulting in 
very important aspects of common psychology, religion, culture, language, and historical 
identification.”6  Russia is Ukraine’s largest trading partner and energy provider.  Many 
Russian leaders view NATO expansion with distrust, and they have publicly stated that 
Ukrainian membership in NATO will negatively impact relations between the two 
countries.  Ukraine could face an economic and energy crisis if Russia decided to cut off 
trade and resources because of Kyiv’s request for NATO membership.  Also, according 
to Lieven, 
Western intelligence agencies have expressed concern in the past that the 
Russians in Ukraine might secede or put great pressure on the Ukrainian 
state to enter a new union with Russia (for example, the U.S. intelligence 
community’s 1994 assessment of Ukraine’s political situation)…Russian 
officials for their part have privately threatened that if Ukraine takes a 
strongly anti-Russian stand in its foreign policies - for example, by  
 
 
4 Janusz Bugajski, Ukraine: A Net Assessment of 16 Years of Independence (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, February 2008), 31. 
5 Taras Kuzio, “Reflections on NATO - Will Ukraine and Georgia Ever Join This Alliance?” Kyiv 
Post, April 2008, 18. Available from http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/oped/26493/ (accessed 22 February 
2008). 
6 Anatol Lieven, Russia and Ukraine: A Fraternal Rivalry (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1999), 79. 
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seeking to join NATO - the Russian government will “activate” the 
Russians in Ukraine in such a way as to divide, weaken, and possibly 
destroy the Ukrainian state.7   
In the foreseeable future, Russian influence will continue to negatively affect Ukraine’s 
NATO aspiration. 
The other main external variable affecting Ukraine’s prospects for membership in 
the Alliance is NATO itself.  To become a member, Ukraine must be unanimously 
accepted by current members.  While some NATO members support Ukraine’s 
accession, particularly the United States, there are other members who do not support it at 
this time.  Some feel that Ukraine is not ready yet; it still needs to develop its political, 
economic, and military institutions.  Some members do not want to antagonize Russia.  
They realize the importance Russia places on Ukraine not becoming a member of NATO.  
According to Alexei Makarkin, an analyst at Moscow’s Center for Political 
Technologies, “Ukraine’s accession will most certainly provoke sharp anti-Western 
sentiments in the Russian elite and the public.  The psychological injury will fan the siege 
mentality, which is only a step away from another, though slightly different, cold war.”8  
Energy dependence on Russia probably also plays a key role in the reluctance of some 
NATO members to admit Ukraine into the Alliance.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Andriy Bychenko and Leonid Polyakov, experts with the Ukrainian Center for 
Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS), conducted a survey in July 2000.  Across all 
regions, 2,005 Ukrainians were polled regarding their opinions on NATO.  Of these, 51 
percent surveyed stated that Ukraine should never join the Alliance; 23 percent said 
Ukraine should join in 5 to 10 years; and 9 percent said Ukraine should join in 10 to 15 
years.9  In 2007, another poll was conducted of 11,000 Ukrainians across all regions of 
 
7 Lieven, Russia and Ukraine: A Fraternal Rivalry, 50. 
8 Alexei Makarkin, “Ukraine Headed for NATO,” RIA Novosti, 5 May 2006.  Available from 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-104-36.cfm  (accessed 25 March 2008). 
9 Andriy Bychenko and Leonid Polyakov, “How Much of NATO do Ukrainians Want?” (The 
Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 1 July 2000). Available from 
http://www.uceps.org/eng/show/544/ (accessed 25 March 2008).  
  5
                                                
the country.  40.2 percent said they were absolutely against membership in NATO; 19.6 
percent were against; 9.8 percent were supportive; and 9.3 percent were fully 
supportive.10   Therefore, despite increased cooperation between the current Ukrainian 
government and NATO, over half of the population still does not want Kyiv to join the 
Alliance.  Polyakov and Bychenko concluded from their study that:  
For Ukrainians, NATO is: (a) a seemingly aggressive bloc which, for 
unknown reasons, does not pose any threat to Ukraine; (b) an alliance of 
democratic and rich countries unwilling to help Ukraine in the event of 
aggression against poor, half-democratic Ukraine. Consequently: (c) we 
do not entrust European security to the Alliance, and (d) our desire to join 
NATO is not very strong…The most positive attitude toward NATO is 
demonstrated by those who know more about it (experts and people aware 
of the PfP Programme). Those who know less about NATO's activities are 
more negative, and sometimes hostile to NATO. Such an attitude is 
evidently based on poor information about NATO in the Ukrainian press, 
and mainly anti-NATO materials of Russian mass media which are much 
more accessible to the average Ukrainian than Western mass media.11 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the Ukrainian public is poorly informed about 
NATO.  Some believe that the negativity expressed toward NATO is a result of years of 
Soviet influence. “Soviet brainwashing,” retorted Anton Buteiko, a deputy foreign 
minister in 2006.12  In response, the Ukrainian government launched an educational 
campaign on NATO across the country. According to Article 4 of the NATO-Ukraine 
Annual Target Plan: “In 2006, Ukraine will make a concerted effort to increase public 
awareness about the alliance and the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership.”13  This 
campaign includes increased cooperation between state authorities and non-governmental 
organizations, local administrations, the NATO-Ukraine Civic League and the NATO 
Information and Documentation Centre (NIDC) in Kyiv.  Conferences, round-tables and 
 
10 “Most Ukrainians support EU, oppose NATO membership-poll,” (Ukrainian Centre for Economic 
and Political Studies, 26 June 2007). Available from http://www.uceps.org/eng/show/1050/ (accessed 25 
March 2008). 
11 Bychenko and Polyakov, “How Much of NATO do Ukrainians Want?” 
12 “Europe: Surrounding Russia; Georgia, Ukraine and NATO,” The Economist, 17 June 2006, 44.  
Available from http://proquest.umi.com/ (accessed 23 March 2008). 
13 “NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2006 in the Framework of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan,” 
par. 21. Available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b060407e.pdf (accessed 24 March 2008); italics 
in the original. 
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workshops will be organized to increase awareness.  Also, “the State Television and 
Radio Committee, in cooperation with the National Centre on Euro-Atlantic Integration 
of Ukraine, will continue to monitor public opinion on NATO-Ukraine cooperation and 
Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration policy through semi-annual polling.  These polls will 
seek to identify common public misperceptions, and the results will support 
recommendations for coordination of a national information policy in this area.”14 
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stated that “NATO’s doors, 
to an even closer relationship, remain open, but it is ultimately up to Ukraine’s people, 
and their elected leaders, to determine the country’s future path with NATO.”15   
Increased public support for NATO, demonstrated through a nation-wide referendum, 
will significantly boost Ukraine’s membership aspiration. One expert believes that public 
opinion in Ukraine can be easily swayed.  Sergei Markov is the Director of the Institute 
of Political Studies in Moscow and an advisor to the Russian foreign minister and 
presidential administration on foreign policy issues.  In his words:   
The obstacle in the form of Ukrainian public opinion will be easily 
cleared.  A massive propaganda campaign will be launched, bankrolled by 
NATO.  The issue of NATO membership will, as Yushchenko promised, 
go before a referendum.  The question, however, will not be “Do you want 
Ukraine to become a member of the North Atlantic alliance and to send its 
soldiers to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan?” It will be different: “Do you 
agree with military reform in Ukraine, which includes NATO membership 
and transition from conscription to a contract-based, professional army?” 
The majority will vote for abolishing the draft.  The conscripts’ mothers 
will overwhelm the opponents.16     
Craig Nation, director of Eurasian and Russian studies at the U.S. Army War 
College, wrote in 2000 that domestic opposition “will remain on Ukraine’s agenda for 
some time to come, and in the best of circumstances Kyiv will require a decade or more 
 
14 “NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2006 in the Framework of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan,” 
par. 22, italics in the original.  
15 “Introductory remarks by the Secretary General, Informal meeting of the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers,” 27 April 2007.  Available from 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070427a.html (accessed 30 May 2008).  
16 Sergei Markov, “Ukraine’s NATO Membership is Path to ‘Small’ Cold War,” Moscow News (in 
English), 20 June 2007.  Available from http://proquest.umi.com/ (accessed 22 March 2008).    
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to prepare for accession to Western institutions.”17  Reversing public opinion on NATO 
is a long-term problem.  According to Nation, the “Russian factor is more troublesome in 
the short term…there is no sign that Russia has any intention of abandoning its strong 
opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO.”18  In order for NATO and Ukraine to 
avoid confrontation with Russia, Nation recommended “the NATO-Ukraine 
relationship…remain limited to nation assistance and security coordination.”19 
John Kriendler, professor of NATO and European security issues at the George C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, disagreed in his 2007 study.  He analyzed 
the costs and benefits of Ukraine in NATO, and came to the conclusion that the benefits 
would far outweigh the costs.  “The complex challenge then is for Ukraine to build the 
necessary political consensus, successfully market itself to NATO allies, and develop the 
necessary rapprochement with Russia.”20 
Building the necessary political consensus in Ukraine may prove difficult.  
According to a recent CRS Report for the U.S. Congress, “If policies to secure NATO 
membership move forward, the Party of Regions and the Communists can be expected to 
try to slow down or block these efforts, including stirring up anti-NATO sentiment in the 
eastern and southern parts of the country.”21  Ukrainian opinion regarding NATO 
membership is regionalized.  The southern and eastern portions of the country are 
strongly against it, while the central and western portions of the country are mixed in 
their opinion regarding NATO. 
Marketing Ukraine to NATO allies will also prove to a difficult challenge. As 
mentioned previously, NATO officials and members of the Alliance desire a positive, 
nation-wide referendum to be held regarding NATO before consideration will be given to 
 
17 Craig Nation, NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2000), 19. Available from 
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/nation.pdf (accessed 28 March 2008). 
18 Nation, NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine, 36. 
19 Ibid., 36. 
20 Kriendler, Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs, Misconceptions and Urban Legends, 
12. 
21 Steven Woehrel, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Report 
for Congress, RL33460, 17 December 2007, 7. 
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membership.  Also, necessary political reforms must take place.  According to Janusz 
Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), priority measures 
to improve governance should include constitutional reform, judicial reform, 
administrative reform, and greater transparency and responsiveness.  Improvement in 
these areas will signal Ukraine’s commitment to integration with Western institutions 
such as NATO.  Bugajski concluded, “If they wish to become a candidate for NATO, the 
Ukrainian authorities must demonstrate their long-term commitment to transatlantic 
security and values and explain to their citizens the nature and value of the alliance.”22 
However, even political reform and improved public perception of NATO may 
not be enough to propel Ukraine into this Alliance.  David Yost, a professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, wrote in 1998 that “Ukrainian accession to the Alliance is a distant 
prospect, because of a general Western reluctance to confront Russia in such a sensitive 
area.”23  Ukraine is of utmost importance to Russia, strategically and psychologically. 
According to Yost, a key issue among European countries is the fear that enlargement 
may increase the risk of confrontation with Moscow.24  According to The Economist, 
“The Americans want to bring in both Georgia and Ukraine, but other NATO 
governments are less gung-ho.  One reason is that some of the democratic sheen has 
come off both [the Rose and Orange] revolutions.  Another is that many Europeans feel 
that the Alliance is already big enough, and that some newer members joined too soon.  
Some members also do not want NATO to move further and faster than the European 
Union.  And a few are against because they fear antagonising the Russians.”25  Also, the 
fact that 27 percent of the oil and 24 percent of the gas consumed in the EU are of 
Russian origin does not help Ukraine’s cause.26  There is a fear that Russia could cut off 
 
22 Bugajski, Ukraine: A Net Assessment of 16 Years of Independence, 31.   
23 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 155.  
24 Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 122. 
25“Europe: Surrounding Russia; Georgia, Ukraine and NATO,” The Economist. 
26 Jeronim Perovic, “Russian Energy Power Abroad,” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 33, 22 January 
2008, 2.  Available from 
http://www.informest.it/docs/documenti/RU_20080225161219_RU_RAD_33_2007.pdf (accessed 31 May 
2008).  
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energy to Ukraine and to countries that support Ukraine’s cause.  Some NATO members 
have raised questions about what the response would be in such a situation.  
D. IMPORTANCE 
This research is pertinent because Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO has a 
bearing on the prospects for international security and stability.  The NATO enlargement 
process in Ukraine might in some circumstances lead to unstable situations.  The threat of 
social unrest, political turmoil, and unsettling Russian reactions is real.  Maintaining the 
peace between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine is a paramount 
concern, because conflict could have destabilizing effects within Ukraine and the 
surrounding region.  Conversely, in the proper conditions NATO membership for 
Ukraine might have stabilizing effects and help to lead Russia away from what some 
experts have called a neo-imperial policy.  Ukraine’s possible membership is of vital 
importance not only to NATO, but also to the European Union and the West in general. 
E. METHODS 
This thesis relies on a qualitative and historical methodology to assess the main 
variables affecting Ukraine’s NATO membership aspiration.   These variables include 
two main internal factors (Ukrainian public opinion and the political situation in Ukraine) 
and two principal external factors (the Russian Federation and NATO itself).  These 
variables are analyzed to provide historical perspective regarding the current situation. 
The goals are to assess the prospects for Ukraine’s membership in NATO and to advance 




F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II examines the internal factors – that 
is, public opinion and domestic politics.  Chapter III analyzes the main external factor to 
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the north and east – Russia.  Chapter IV considers the deliberations and competing views 
within NATO.  Chapter V offers conclusions. 
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II. UKRAINE IN NATO: THE DYNAMIC WITHIN ITS BORDERS 
This chapter focuses on the factors affecting Ukraine’s NATO membership 
aspiration within its boundaries - namely its society and the evolving Ukrainian political 
scene.  These two factors are important because, according to R. Craig Nation, an 
American analyst, “the most serious threats to stability today are located within Ukraine 
itself, in the potential for social and political unrest.”27 NATO’s policies regarding 
Ukraine have attempted to offer support in these two areas. 
As James Sherr has pointed out, “The public’s changing mood on NATO has been 
carefully followed by Ukrainian media and think tanks, with the latest research showing 
that both ambivalence and curiosity regarding the organization are on the rise.  However, 
half of Ukrainians still oppose membership whereas, depending on the survey, only up to 
30 percent would approve of it.”28 As noted previously, in a July 2000 survey 2,005 
Ukrainians were polled regarding their opinion of NATO.  In this survey, 51 percent of 
Ukrainians polled said they would never vote for Ukraine’s accession to NATO.  
Furthermore, 46.2 percent of those polled viewed NATO as an aggressive military bloc, 
21.5 percent viewed it as a defense alliance, 16.5 percent viewed it as a peacekeeping 
organization and 15.8 percent could not decide how to classify it.  When asked which 
institution ensured regional security in Europe, NATO received only 4.1 percent of the 
vote while the UN received a plurality of the votes at 39.3 percent.29   
A more recent poll was conducted in 2007 among 11,000 Ukrainians.  
“Responding to a question about their attitude to NATO membership, 40.2 percent said 
they were absolutely against, 19.6 percent were against, 9.8 percent were supportive and 
 
27 Craig Nation, NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine, (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2000), 19 
28 James Sherr, At the Crossroads or The Precipice? The Fate of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and its 
Implications for Europe (Shrivenham, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defense Academy of the 
United Kingdom, March 2006), 9. 
29 Andriy Bychenko and Leonid Polyakov, “How Much of NATO do Ukrainians Want?” (The 
Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 1 July 2000). 
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9.3 percent fully supportive.”30  In addition, the Kyiv-based Sofia think tank conducted 
a poll of Ukrainian citizens in May 2008, and only 21.4 percent of Ukrainians supported 
NATO membership for Ukraine. 31   
In the face of poll findings such as these, Anton Buteiko, a deputy foreign 
minister, said, “Soviet brainwashing.”32  A similar view was expressed by Ukrainian 
foreign minister Hennadiy Udovenko when he stated that Ukrainian “minds are 
penetrated by Communist ideology which said that NATO was enemy number one…and 
now suddenly we say that NATO does not pose a threat to us.  This is strongly challenged 
by a part of our society.”33  The “Soviet brainwashing” factor is one part of the equation, 
due to the extensive cultural and historical ties between Ukraine and Russia.  Many 
Ukrainians fear that Ukrainian membership in NATO would worsen ties with Russia.   
Another part of the equation has to do with recent world events.  As James Sherr has 
observed, “In the wake of the Kosovo crisis and Iraq war, NATO continues to be 
regarded with pronounced suspicion.” 34  Also, memories still linger of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, in which Ukrainian draftees were forced to participate.  Some 
Ukrainians fear that NATO membership could “embroil them in Afghanistan again, and 
in similar conflicts in distant parts of the world.”35    
Russians have taken note of the anti-NATO views of many Ukrainians.  Sergei 
Markov of the Moscow Institute of Political Studies refers to Ukraine’s public opinion as 
the leader of the NATO “con party” in Ukraine.  “The ‘con party’ is led by Ukraine’s 
public opinion, driven by the reluctance to see the country become an enemy of Russia, 
 
30  “Most Ukrainians support EU, oppose NATO membership — poll.”  
31 Pavel Korduban, “Will NATO become unpopular among Ukrainians?” Eurasia Daily Monitor 
5:111 (11 June 2008).  Available from http://www.jamestown.org/edm (accessed 19 June 2008).   
32 “Europe: Surrounding Russia; Georgia, Ukraine and NATO,” The Economist. 
33 Udovenko quoted in Volodymyr Pedchenko, “Ukraine’s Delicate Balancing Act,” Transitions, June 
1997, 75. 
34 Sherr, At the Crossroads or The Precipice? The Fate of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and its 
Implications for Europe, 9.  
35 Paul Gallis, Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, RL34415, 18 April 2008, 24. 
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as well as by the general distrust of NATO.”36  Another Russian who has noticed the 
Ukrainian opinion polls is Russia’s former president, Vladimir Putin.  At a February 2008 
press conference in Munich, when he was still serving as President, Putin was asked a 
question regarding Ukraine and NATO.  He stated, “As for the situation in Ukraine, 
according to the information I have, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians oppose 
joining NATO.  But the Ukrainian leadership has nonetheless signed a certain document 
on starting the accession procedure.  Is this democracy? Were the country’s citizens 
asked their opinion?”37  The Russian influence on Ukraine’s NATO membership 
aspiration is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.  
Western analysts and officials have also taken note of these polls.  James Sherr, a 
British expert, stated, “Until Yushchenko and pro-NATO institutions lose their timidity 
and confront public prejudice directly, membership of the Alliance will remain off the 
table.”38  From the U.S. point of view, “U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Daniel 
Fried made clear that a decision about whether NATO integration is a good idea is up to 
the people of Ukraine, a view that one can safely assume all allies would be sympathetic 
to.”39  
Ukrainian officials understand that the majority of Ukrainian citizens are against 
membership in NATO.  In their view, the key is to educate the public on NATO’s 
purposes, and get rid of the “Soviet brainwashing” ideas of NATO.  As noted in Chapter 
I, a plan by the Ukrainian government to improve the image of NATO among Ukrainians 
has been in development since 2006.  Article 4 of the 2006 NATO-Ukraine Annual 
Target Plan states: 
 
 
36 Sergei Markov, “Ukraine’s NATO Membership is Path to ‘Small’ Cold War”. 
37 Vladimir Putin, “Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference,” President of Russia Official Web 
Portal, 14 February 2008.  http://kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/14/1011_type82915_160266.shtml  
38 Sherr, At the Crossroads or The Precipice? The Fate of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and its 
Implications for Europe, 9. 
39 John Kriendler, Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs, Misconceptions and Urban 
Legends, 10. 
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In 2006, Ukraine will make a concerted effort to increase public awareness 
about the alliance and the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership.  In this 
context, it will work to strengthen cooperation between state authorities 
and non-governmental organizations and to increase the involvement of 
local administrations in NATO-Ukraine cooperative projects.  In carrying 
this effort forward, the Ukrainian authorities will work closely with the 
NATO-Ukraine Civic League and the NATO Information and 
Documentation Centre (NIDC) in Kyiv to organize conferences, 
roundtables, and workshops on Ukraine’s aspirations to membership in the 
Alliance…Ukraine will also ensure full implementation of the State 
Programme of Public Information on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Integration 
for 2004-2007, including their adequate financing in accordance with an 
October 2005 Presidential Decree.  The State Television and Radio 
Committee, in cooperation with the National Centre on Euro-Atlantic 
Integration of Ukraine, will continue to monitor public opinion on NATO-
Ukraine cooperation and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration policy 
through semi-annual polling.  These polls will seek to identify common 
public misperceptions, and the results will support recommendations for 
coordination of a national information policy in this area.40 
The NATO International Staff is also aware of the Ukrainian polls, and 
understands that this issue must be addressed before Ukraine could be offered 
membership in the alliance. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently 
stated that “NATO’s doors, to an even closer relationship, remain open, but it is 
ultimately up to Ukraine’s people, and their elected leaders, to determine the country’s 
path with NATO.”41 In response, “Kiev has assured Brussels that Ukraine would join 
NATO only after asking the opinion of the Ukrainian people.”42  The views of the NATO 
International Staff and NATO countries with regard to Ukrainian public opinion about 
NATO are discussed further in Chapter IV.   
 
 
40 “NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2006 in the Framework of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan,” 
par. 21-22, italics in the original.  
41 Kriendler, Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs, Misconceptions and Urban Legends, 
10. 
42 “NATO and Ukraine: Who Needs the Other More?” Russian News and Information Agency 
Novosti, 18 January 2008.  Available from http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080118/97289307.html (accessed 22 
March 2008). 
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Some experts believe that the process of establishing a positive view of NATO 
throughout Ukrainian society will be lengthy.  According to R. Craig Nation, the director 
of Russian and Eurasian studies at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA, “The 
limits to NATO-Ukrainian cooperation derive both from Ukraine’s domestic weakness, 
and concern for possible Russian reactions.  The threat of domestic instability will remain 
on Ukraine’s agenda for some time to come, and in the best of circumstances Kyiv will 
require a decade and more to prepare for accession to Western institutions.”43  It will take 
time for the educational process to influence public opinion regarding NATO.  Also, it 
will take time for Ukrainian society to fully trust the government and its institutions.  
Ukraine has been independent only since 1991, and its institutions are still developing.  
Years of corruption during previous administrations and a shaky economy have not 
fostered a positive outlook among the population.  Indeed, according to one study, “Less 
than 10 percent of the population unconditionally trusts the government.”44     
Other experts believe that public opinion in Ukraine can be easily swayed.  As 
noted previously, Sergei Markov has stated that:  
The obstacle in the form of Ukrainian public opinion will be easily 
cleared.  A massive propaganda campaign will be launched, bankrolled by 
NATO.  The issue of NATO membership will, as Yushchenko promised, 
go before a referendum.  The question, however, will not be “Do you want 
Ukraine to become a member of the North Atlantic alliance and to send its 
soldiers to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan?” It will be different: “Do you 
agree with military reform in Ukraine, which includes NATO membership 
and transition from conscription to a contract-based, professional army?” 
The majority will vote for abolishing the draft.  The conscripts’ mothers 
will overwhelm the opponents.45  
Despite this claim, attempts to alter Ukrainian public opinion have yielded bleak 
results. A 2008 poll conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political 
Studies (UCEPS) asked Ukrainians if they had changed their attitude toward NATO 
 
43 Nation, NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine, 36. 
44 Anatoliy Grytsenko and Leonid Polyakov, “Ukraine-NATO: The Future Depends on the Past,” 
(The Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 7 December 2003).  Available from 
http://www.uceps.org (accessed 13 March 2008). 
45 Sergei Markov, “Ukraine’s NATO Membership is Path to ‘Small’ Cold War.” 
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between 2004 and 2007.  Of those polled, 61.9 percent responded that their opinion did 
not change, 9 percent responded that their opinion changed for the worse, and 10.9 
percent responded that their opinion changed for the better.  In addition, 11.7 percent 
responded that they have no interest in the question, and 6.5 percent responded that it was 
difficult to say how their attitude was affected.46  These results suggest that more time 
and effort will be necessary to alter the opinions of Ukrainians regarding NATO 
membership.    
To understand Ukrainian public opinion it must be noted that Ukraine is 
regionalized, and does not possess a developed or unified national identity.  “Lacking any 
real experience of independent statehood prior to 1991, Ukraine has confronted the 
difficult challenge of building and sustaining a national identity.  Underdeveloped 
national consciousness has been manifested by an aggravated and sometimes antagonistic 
regionalism.”47  Many Ukrainians could be described as tuteshni - people whose primary 
identification is with their locality rather than with their state or nation.48   
Ethnic Russians make up 17.3 percent of Ukraine’s population, and are 
concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country.49  Ethnic Ukrainians in 
these regions tend to be Russian-speaking, are suspicious of Ukrainian nationalism, and 
support close ties with Russia. The people in the western regions are predominantly 
ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian and tend to be sympathetic to Ukrainian 
nationalism.  “According to the independent Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 
people in Ukraine’s eight western provinces, who make up about a quarter of the 
electorate, are eight times more likely to vote for the ‘Orange’ parties headed by 
President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, which stand for 
 
46 “Did you change during 2004 – 2007 your attitude toward NATO?” (The Ukrainian Centre for 
Economic and Political Studies).  Available from http://www.uceps.org/poll.php?poll_id=135 (accessed 13 
July 2008). 
47 Nation, NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine, 10. 
48 Lieven, Russia and Ukraine: A Fraternal Rivalry, 79. 
49 2001 Ukraine census.  Available from http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/ 
(accessed 22 March 2008).  
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integrating with the European Union, joining NATO and keeping Russia at a distance.”50  
According to a 2005 survey, 31.3 percent of those polled in the western regions voted for 
Ukraine’s accession to NATO, while 32.1 percent voted against it.51  This is by far the 
most balanced vote for NATO accession in any Ukrainian region.   “In the three eastern 
provinces, also containing a quarter of the electorate, people are eight times more likely 
to vote for the ‘Blue’ Party of Regions, headed by former Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovych, which wants to make Russian the second official language, forge closer 
economic ties with Russia and stay out of NATO.”52  According to the 2005 survey, 77.6 
percent of those polled in the eastern regions were against NATO accession.53   
The central region of Ukraine is geographically, politically and culturally “in the 
middle” of the eastern and western regions of Ukraine.  There is a more balanced mix of 
ethnicities located here.  Although most of the population is Ukrainian-speaking and 
committed to Ukrainian independence, they “have a much milder and less ethnic version 
of Ukrainian nationalism and a much calmer and friendlier attitude toward Russians.”54  
As Anatol Lieven notes, “It is this central region of Ukraine – and not the west or the east 
- that has provided the dominant elements in the Ukrainian administrations since 
independence…and could be said to have saved the country. If Galicia and the Russian-
speaking areas of Donetsk or Kharkiv – let alone Crimea – had been geographically 
contiguous to each other, the unity and peace of Ukraine would have been in serious 
doubt.”55  According to the 2005 survey, 79.7 percent of those polled in this region were 
against NATO accession.56   
 
50 “Ukraine’s Orange-Blue Divide,” The Christian Science Monitor, 28 September 2007, 4.  
http://www.proquest.umi.com/ (accessed 14 March 2008). 
51 Andriy Yakovenko, “Ukraine’s Search for its Place in Europe: the East or the West?” (Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2007), 79. 
52 “Ukraine’s Orange-Blue Divide”, 4. 
53 Yakovenko, “Ukraine’s Search for its Place in Europe: the East or the West?”  78.  
54 Lieven, Russia and Ukraine: A Fraternal Rivalry, 82. 
55 Ibid., 82. 




                                                
Finally, as mentioned previously, the southern region of Ukraine has a large 
proportion of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians residing within its 
territories.  This region includes the fragile, autonomous republic of Crimea and the city 
of Sevastopol.  In Crimea, 58.3 percent of the population is ethnic Russian while 71.6 
percent of the population in Sevastopol is ethnic Russian.57   
Crimea has been a location of severe anti-NATO protests – specifically, protests 
against the annual multinational military exercise hosted by Ukraine named “Sea 
Breeze.”  Of particular note was the 2006 version of “Sea Breeze.”  Protests broke out 
after U.S. Marines arrived in the city of Feodosiya to take part in the exercise. The 
Marines eventually withdrew from the peninsula, and the Crimean Parliament declared 
Crimea a “NATO-free territory.”   
Sevastopol is the homeport of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and Russians view it 
as having great historical and strategic importance.   An agreement was reached between 
Ukraine and Russia for Russian ships to remain in place until 2017, with Russia leasing 
the facilities from Ukraine.  The local ethnic Russian population strongly supports the 
presence of the Russian fleet.  According to the 2005 survey, the largest opposition to 
accession to NATO is represented here in the southern regions, or 79.7 percent.58  
Crimea and its potential impact on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspiration are discussed 
further in Chapter III.  To conclude, as Andriy Bychenko and Leonid Polyakov have
d:  
For Ukrainians, NATO is: (a) a seemingly aggressive bloc which, for 
unknown reasons, does not pose any threat to Ukraine; (b) an alliance of 
democratic and rich countries unwilling to help Ukraine in the event of 
aggression against poor, half-democratic Ukraine. Consequently: (c) we 
do not entrust European security to the Alliance, and (d) our desire to join 
NATO is not very strong…the attitude toward NATO on the part of 
Ukraine's population is rather contradictory. Ukrainians are clearly 
sympathetic to the ‘western way of life’, but unprepared to fight for it; 
they would like to stay away from any disputes between Russia and the 
West, and not take any sides.  The most positive attitude toward NATO is 
demonstrated by those who know more about it (experts and people aware 
 
57 2001 Ukraine census. 
58 Yakovenko, “Ukraine’s Search for its Place in Europe: the East or the West?”  78. 
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ch 
more accessible to the average Ukrainian than Western mass media.59   
loyment and delayed payment of 
wages, pensions, stipends and other social benefits.60  
Independent States (CIS) country to join the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.   
                                                
of the PfP Programme). Those who know less about NATO's activities are 
more negative, and sometimes hostile to NATO. Such an attitude is 
evidently based on poor information about NATO in the Ukrainian press, 
and mainly anti-NATO materials of Russian mass media which are mu
Instead of accession to NATO, over half of Ukrainian society would like to see 
the government focus on the overall economic situation in Ukraine.  This includes the 
general deterioration of the standard of living, unemp
Since independence, Ukrainian governments have had differing approaches 
regarding NATO.  “The man who led Ukraine to independence, Leonid M. Kravchuk, 
until a few months before the collapse of communism was the party secretary in charge 
of ideology - the very same man who used to denounce the use of the Ukrainian language 
as ‘bourgeoisie nationalism.’”61 Even though Kravchuk had ties to the former Soviet 
regime, he sought to strengthen Ukraine’s sovereignty and improve relations with the 
West.  Kravchuk stated, “The best guarantee to Ukraine’s security would be membership 
to NATO.”62  Kravchuk maintained ties with Moscow, mainly to prevent his country 
from falling into economic ruin, but he kept his position on NATO firm while serving as 
president (1991 – 1994) and subsequently.  In a July 2008 speech, Kravchuk stated, 
“Ukraine must protect its national interests, independence and territorial integrity.  Such 
protection can be provided by the Alliance only. There are no other structures in Europe, 
capable to protect Ukraine.”63  In 1994, Ukraine (then under Kravchuk’s leadership) 
became the first Commonwealth of 
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Tor Bukkvoll has described the view held by a prominent supporter of 
Kravchuk’s government:  “The former chairman of the Ukrainian parliament’s 
Committee for Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Pavlycho, in outlining the direction of Ukrainian 
foreign policy, stated: ‘Our foreign policy has to lead us to Europe, where we were born 
and where we grew up as a nation, and from where we were torn away and put in an 
Asian imprisonment, redressed in Muscovite clothes, and educated in the Slavic-Russian 
language of Genghis-Khan’s great-grandchildren.’”64 
When elections came in 1994, Leonid Kuchma replaced Kravchuk as the 
president of Ukraine.  Kuchma favored a policy of mnogovektornost: a “multi-vector” 
policy that placed equal emphasis on relations with Russia and the West.65  Despite 
wanting to maintain good relations with the West, Kuchma initially was against NATO 
enlargement.  “During a visit to the United States in November 1994, newly elected 
President Leonid Kuchma expressed great skepticism regarding the idea of an 
enlargement of NATO to the east.”66  However, Kuchma quickly shifted his attitude 
regarding NATO.  “When U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Kiev in May of 1995, 
Kuchma surprised most observers by telling him that he believed NATO would be a 
guarantor for stability in Europe, and that Kyiv was no longer against NATO 
enlargement.”67  The benefits that his regime sought from improved relations with 
NATO were increased Euro-Atlantic identity, security and prosperity.  “During the 
1990s, Ukraine became the third largest recipient of U.S. assistance, after Israel and 
Egypt.”68  Cooperation was significantly increased between NATO and Ukraine during 
Kuchma’s ten years in office, most notably with the “NATO-Ukraine Action Plan.”  
Despite Kuchma’s policy reversal on NATO enlargement and increased cooperation, 
S
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rowth in later years), widespread corruption, and a deteriorating human rights 
record.
ffice in January 2005.  
Yanuk
described the importance of the Orange 
Revolu
tates: most are super-presidential systems that dominate the largely 
                                                
 
Woehrel states, “His rule was characterized by fitful economic reform (albeit with solid 
economic g
”69  
In 2004, presidential elections were held between, among other candidates, the 
pro-Russian, anti-NATO Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and the pro-Western, pro-
NATO former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko.  The elections were criticized as not 
free and fair by international observers for many reasons, specifically media bias towards 
Yanukovych, abuse of absentee ballots, inaccurate voter lists, and the barring of 
opposition representatives from electoral commissions.  There were suspicions of 
Russian interference on behalf of Yanukovych.  A runoff occurred in November, and 
Yanukovych was declared the winner.  Yushchenko’s supporters accused Yanukovych of 
electoral fraud, and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians blockaded government offices 
in Kyiv and appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Court to invalidate the vote.  This came 
to be known as the “Orange Revolution,” after Yushchenko’s chosen campaign color.70  
The court invalidated the election, and Yushchenko won the December re-vote 51.99 
percent to Yanukovych’s 44.19 percent.  Yushchenko took o
ovych became Yushchenko’s Prime Minister a year later. 
Taras Kuzio of the Kyiv Post recently 
tion in regards to NATO.  In his words:  
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution led to a fundamental reform of the 
Constitution that moved the country away from the abused super-
presidentialism prevalent under former President Leonid Kuchma to a 
parliamentary system.  Control over the government has been transferred 
from the executive to the winning parliamentary coalition while the 
president retains key areas of control, such as foreign and defense policy.  
Ukraine’s reformed political system has improved democratization by 
leading to greater checks and balances between different branches of 
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tern Europe and the 
Baltic states who have joined NATO and the EU.71   
 to marginalize the 
opposition from the State Duma with a threshold of seven percent.   
ship, at least in terms of the democratic 
standards adopted in its political institutions. 
Ukraine’s foreign policy...In the longer term, Yushchenko wants Ukraine to join the 
                                                
 
autocratic CIS where democracy has regressed.  Parliamentary systems 
dominate the successful democracies of Central-Eas
Kuzio also noted that, in addition to having parliamentary systems, all post-
communist states that have joined NATO and the EU do not marginalize the opposition 
with high thresholds to gain representation in parliament, and they uphold the rule of law.  
Ukraine has a threshold of 3 percent, which is lower than the European average of 4 
percent.  Ukraine’s influential neighbor, Russia, has been able
In reference to the 2007 parliamentary elections that Yulia Tymoshenko won, 
Yushchenko stated that “We have to involve the opposition in forming the 
government…One must take into account that Mr. Yanukovych received one-third of the 
votes in the election.”72  Since the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Ukrainian 
parliament has been divided as follows: Viktor Yanukovych’s party, the “Party of 
Regions,” has 34 percent of the seats in parliament; Tymoshenko’s Party has 30.71 
percent of the seats; Yushchenko’s Party, “Our Ukraine/People’s Self Defense,” has 
14.15 percent of the seats; and the Communist Party has 5.39 percent.73  There are also 
several other parties with less representation. In short, Ukraine has a parliamentary 
system, the rule of law is in the process of being reformed, and the opposition is 
represented in the Rada (parliament).  Therefore, if Kuzio is correct in his analysis, 
Ukraine is on the path to NATO member
As Steven Woehrel has observed, “After taking office as President, Yushchenko 
put integration into the global economy and Euro-Atlantic institutions at the center of 
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European Union and NATO.”74  There have been numerous statements from his 
government regarding Euro-Atlantic integration.  First Vice Prime Minister Oleksandr 
Turchynov stressed that, “Today, leaders of the state have a common point of view of 
further prospects of Ukraine towards the Euro-Atlantic integration.  Ukraine’s 
consistency towards Europe and a stand which the President of Ukraine, government and 
the parliamentary majority take is evidence of the seriousness of our intentions…Ukraine 
is a European country and should be among the European states.  From this point of view, 
cooperation with NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration is an important element.”75 Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has been described over the years as “lukewarm” regarding 
NATO.  However, she has stated that “her priorities would be to fight corruption and to 
adopt concrete reforms that would bring Kyiv closer to its long-term goals of joining the 
European Union and the NATO military alliance.”76  She has also emphasized the 
importance of the government’s implementation of programs and information campaigns 
that will enhance NATO’s image among Ukrainian citizens.   
Under Yushchenko, an “Intensified Dialogue” on membership with NATO was 
launched in 2005.  According to Grigoriy M. Perepelytsia, a Ukrainian expert, “The aim 
of this dialogue is to give Ukrainian officials the opportunity to learn more about what 
would be expected of Ukraine as a potential member of the Alliance, while 
simultaneously letting NATO examine Ukrainian reforms and capabilities.”77  Continued 
progress has been made toward NATO membership.  The next major step to NATO 
integration for Ukraine is obtaining a Membership Action Plan (MAP).  A NATO MAP 
is a major achievement in the NATO membership process.  In the words of Perepelytsia: 
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In the MAP framework, Annual National Programmes are developed 
which focus on a number of requirements for aspirant countries, including 
in the political, economic, resource, legal and security fields.  Aspirant 
countries are expected to demonstrate a functioning democratic political 
system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority 
populations; commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes with 
neighbours; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to 
the Alliance; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and 
structures.78 
However, one further note regarding a MAP for Ukraine should be understood.  
According to Perepelytsia, “It [a MAP] would not, however, guarantee any future 
membership in the Alliance - such an invitation would depend on the country’s ability to 
meet membership criteria.”79   
According to Steven Woehrel of the Congressional Research Service, “In August 
2006, the Yanukovych government postponed making a formal request for a MAP, 
saying that more time was needed to educate the Ukrainian public about NATO and for 
Ukraine and NATO to improve cooperation under existing agreements.”80  However, in 
January 2008, “President Viktor Yushchenko, Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk and PM 
[Prime Minister] Yulia Tymoshenko wrote a letter to the NATO Secretary General to 
confirm Ukraine’s effort to join NATO MAP and hope for a positive answer at the 
Ukraine-NATO summit in Bucharest in April.” 81  The NATO Allies chose not to offer 
Ukraine a MAP at the April 2008 summit.  “However, they expressed support for 
Ukraine’s MAP application, and said that Kiev could receive a MAP at the NATO 
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are resolved.”82  The results of the NATO summit in Bucharest and the national views of 
NATO members regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership aspiration are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter IV.  
Political uncertainties within Ukraine may impede its quest for NATO 
membership.  The Freedom House Nations in Transit annual study upgraded Ukraine to 
“free” in 2006, the first CIS state to achieve this rating.83  However, the 2007 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Ukraine 118 out of 179 
countries.84  Furthermore, as recently as October 2008, intra-governmental disputes in 
Ukraine over domestic and international policies resulted in the dismissal of the 
Ukrainian parliament by President Yushchenko.  A new parliamentary election will be 
held in December 2008, which will be the third such election since the 2004 Orange 
Revolution. 
Janusz Bugajski, Director of the New European Democracies Project at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, identified four areas of governance in which 
Ukraine should make progress to support its pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration: 
Constitutional reform.  Ukraine’s constitution and associated laws…need 
to be changed to eliminate ambiguities and draw clear delineations of 
authority between the president and the prime minister, and between the 
Rada and executive branch.   
Judicial reform.  Ukraine needs a judicial branch that can be relied upon to 
make fair decisions…Change is essential to curb corruption, to strengthen 
the rule of law in general and public respect for law, and to improve the 
business and investment climate. 
Administrative reform.  This is needed within the central government and 
between Kyiv and the regions.  Ukraine requires a modern central 
government bureaucracy…to support a modern European state.  
Territorial-administrative reform should make oblast and local officials 
directly accountable to their publics.  
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Greater transparency and responsiveness.  All levels of government need 
to become more transparent.  Too many government decisions are made 
behind closed doors, creating opportunities for corruption and contributing 
to public cynicism about the fairness of state policy.85   
Furthermore, current and future politicians should lessen their ties with the 
“business oligarchs,” or those wealthy businessmen who try to influence Ukrainian 
political decisions.  Some oligarchs have been known to have ties with organized crime.  
According to James Sherr, in Ukraine, “the greatest security problem is the relationship 
between politics, business and crime.”86  These reforms, if implemented, will send a 
strong signal to EU and NATO capitals that Ukraine is committed to reform and 
embarked on a path to Euro-Atlantic integration, including membership in NATO. 
To conclude, it should be stressed again that the most serious threats to Ukraine’s 
stability today are located within its boundaries.  Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO 
membership are achievable goals, and Ukraine is taking positive steps towards these 
goals.  However, it will take time for planned educational reforms to alter the 
predominant anti-NATO opinion in Ukrainian society.  An accelerated pace could have 
destabilizing effects in Ukraine.  Also, the political reforms discussed in this chapter 
should take place to enhance the credibility of national political institutions in the eyes of 
Ukrainian society and current NATO members.  As Perepelytsia has observed, “Any 
future accession of Ukraine to the Alliance will ultimately depend on the ability of the 
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III.  THE RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON UKRAINE’S NATO 
ASPIRATION 
This chapter examines the ability of Russia to influence aspirations to NATO 
membership in Ukrainian society through social, political and economic means.  A brief 
analysis of the historical aspect of this relationship is followed by an examination of 
contemporary issues.   Ukraine and Russia have had formal relations since the 17th 
century, and this relationship could be characterized as asymmetrical.  Imperial Russia, 
the USSR (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), and the Russian Federation 
succeeded in subordinating Ukraine socially, politically and economically for over three 
centuries.  Centuries of not being treated as an equal have driven Ukraine away from 
Russia.    
Despite the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia’s actions in recent years 
indicate that its leadership is seeking to reassert its influence in the region.  Dmitri 
Trenin, a Russian expert, has described Russia’s actions as “working to create its own 
solar system.”88 Ukraine is considered by Russia to be the cornerstone of this “solar 
system.”  However, many Ukrainians do not care to see their country become a planet 
revolving around Russia again.  Russian actions over the last four centuries have stiffened 
Ukraine’s resolve to escape Russian influence, while pushing for membership in Euro-
Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the European Union. 
With regard to the historical significance of Ukraine to Russia, Leonid Polyakov 
states that: 
Ukraine occupies a special place in Russia’s psyche.  Toward no other 
neighbour, Belarus included, does Russia have such strong 
feelings…[M]uch of the Russian population and nearly all of the Russian 
elite still have grave psychological difficulties in accepting the fact of 
Ukrainian independence.  This phenomenon has deep historical roots.  All 
Russians trace their cultural, religious and linguistic roots (and even the 
name of Russia – from ‘Rus’) to a common historical predecessor.  On the 
territory currently occupied by Ukraine, the first Eastern Slavic State, with 
its capital in Kyiv (Kiev), emerged in the early ninth century.  This was 
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Kievan Rus, and it existed until the 13th century.  In contrast, Moscow 
was founded as a small fort in the 12th century and, at the time of its 
subjugation by the Mongols in the middle of the 13th century, was of little 
significance…For four centuries, the two regions developed separately.  
People in the territory around Kyiv were referred to as ‘Russians’, while 
people in the territory ruled by Moscow, though also ‘Russians’, were also 
more specifically referred to as ‘Muscovites.’89  
However, during the centuries after Mongol subjugation (1240 – 1480), Moscow grew in 
power and built an empire by conquering new lands, while Rus-Ukraine struggled under 
Mongol rule and, later, under Polish-Lithuanian rule.90    
In the 17th century, relations worsened between the Ukrainian population and their 
Polish rulers, and a Cossack by the name of Bogdan Khmelnitsk led several uprisings.  
However, these uprisings were put down and overwhelmed by Polish counteroffensives.  
“Faced with the choice of seeking help from the Muslim Ottoman sultan or the Russian 
Orthodox Tsar, they chose to look to Muscovy…Khmelnitsk and his followers swore 
allegiance to Tsar Alexei.”91  This is known as the Pereiaslav agreement, which was 
concluded in 1654.  In the modern era, this is the beginning of the dynamic Russian-
Ukrainian relationship and the root of the superior attitude that condescending Russians 
typically adopt toward Ukrainians: Russians believe Ukraine is dependent on it for 
leadership and protection. 
Immediately after obtaining Khmelnitsk’s oath, the Tsar changed his title from 
“Tsar of All Rus” to “Tsar of All Great and Little Rus.”92 Little Rus was the name given 
to Ukraine.  “Moscow later imposed its power on Kyiv, liquidating Ukraine’s autonomy 
and proclaiming itself the ruler of Ukraine.  In time, ‘Muscovites’ became ‘great 
Russians’ – or simply ‘Russians’ – and Ukrainians – known as ‘small Russians’ – lived 
under Russian, and later Soviet, rule.”93   
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The agreement in Pereiaslav is at the center of much controversy between 
Ukrainians and Russians: 
[T]he Pereiaslav accession has always been of great symbolic importance, 
at least in Russian and Soviet propaganda, and it used to be the key “legal” 
question (insofar as law has any meaningful place in such debates) in the 
Ukrainian-Russian relationship.  For Ukrainians—not just nationalists, but 
those who hoped for an autonomous Ukraine in alliance with Russia—this 
was simply a personal union between two states…Ukrainians point out 
correctly that such personal unions were common in medieval and 
renaissance Europe, and by no means implied the merging of the states 
concerned.  They also point out that the promises made by Tsar Alexei 
amounted…to a guarantee of effective legal and administrative autonomy 
for that part of Ukraine which Khmelnitsky brought under the rule of the 
tsars…[T]hese promises were later broken by Alexei’s successors; 
naturally enough in the view of Ukrainian nationalists, these broken 
promises render the Pereiaslav agreement itself null and void.94  
Russians, on the other hand, view “Khmelnitsky’s submission as the reunification 
of the lands of Rus, destined by religion and history, into one state and under the rule of 
one monarch.”95  Anatol Lieven adds that, “The most extreme claim…is that the 
Ukrainians do not really exist as a nation, and are just a ‘Little Russian’ branch of the 
general stock, destined by history, religion and culture to come under the rule of 
Muscovy.  This was the official position of the imperial Russian state before 1917, and to 
the fury of many Ukrainians, it is still widely held in Russia today.”96 
After subjugating Ukraine to their rule, Russians regarded the Ukrainians as 
inferior.  As Richard Pipes observes, “At no point in its history did Tsarist Russia 
formulate a consistent policy towards the minorities.”97  In Lieven’s view, “Moves by the 
Russian government in the 150 years after Pereiaslav to remove all separate Ukrainian 
institutions were therefore undoubtedly a crime as well as a mistake.”98  The subjection 
of Ukraine to Imperial Russia was blatant.  There were various periods of Russification, 
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and Ukraine’s autonomous institutions and laws were eventually abolished.  Also, the use 
of the Ukrainian language was banned in schools and most publications:  this brought 
Ukrainian cultural movements to a standstill.  “In particular, Catherine the Great’s 
introduction of the Great Russian form of serfdom into the Ukrainian lands was bitterly 
resented by the Ukrainian peasantry.”99   
In summation, regardless of what Russians claim regarding Ukraine’s historic 
dependence on Russia, “Ukrainians possessed many of the attributes which in the 19th 
and 20th centuries have gone to lay the foundations of nationhood for other countries in 
Europe: a widely different historical experience; particular traditions, institutions, and 
customs; and the existence of a separate language, albeit divided into different 
dialects.”100  An additional basis for Ukrainian nationalism and autonomy developed 
among Ukrainian farmers.  Following the liberation of the serfs in 1861, a prosperous 
class of independent farmers developed due to the rich soil available in Ukraine.  They 
viewed their soil as superior to Russia’s, and could make a generous profit in the grain 
business.  They were not interested in Russian agricultural institutions such as the 
commune.  “On the whole, this Ukrainian peasantry knew neither the communal type of 
land ownership nor the service relationship between peasant and landlord.”101  This 
would change drastically when Joseph Stalin came to power and introduced 
collectivization and kolkhozes, or collective farms.  
The Tsarist administration was overthrown in March 1917, and Ukraine enjoyed a 
brief period of independence.  The Ukrainians demonstrated their desire to separate from 
Russian rule by organizing themselves politically. The Ukrainian Central Council, or 
Rada, was formed and based in Kyiv.  In November 1917, the Rada demanded territorial 
autonomy from the Russian provisional government and proclaimed Ukraine an 
independent Ukrainian People’s Republic.  This bid for independence failed because 
another revolution took place in Russia, and the Bolsheviks came to power.    “The Rada 
refused to accept the writ of Sovnarkom [the new Soviet Russian government, or the 
 
99 Lieven, Russia and Ukraine: A Fraternal Rivalry, 22. 
100 Ibid., 22. 
101 Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, 9. 
  31
                                                
Council of People’s Commissars].  Tens of thousands of armed fighters reached Kyiv.  
The struggle was scrappy, and it took until late January before Kyiv was occupied by the 
Bolshevik-led forces.”102  Again, Ukraine was subjugated to Russian rule.  However, in 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet government ceded Ukraine to Germany in 
February 1918.  After Germany signed an armistice with the Western Allies in November 
1918, Ukrainian nationalist forces overthrew the German puppet regime in Kyiv and 
proclaimed Ukraine an independent republic.  However, Soviet forces recaptured Kyiv, 
and by 1920 Soviet rule was consolidated in Ukraine.   
Vladimir Lenin was the new leader in Russia, and he had a cooperative stance on 
nationalism in Ukraine.  He believed in the right to national political self-determination: 
“that is, the right to separation and creation of an independent government.  Every nation 
living in the state had, as a nation, one right and one right only: to separate from Russia 
and to create an independent state…Lenin, however, did not believe in the likelihood of 
Eastern Europe disintegrating into its national components.”103  He believed that 
economic forces worked against the breakup of great states.  He also believed that once 
oppressive force was removed, the psychological basis for nationalism and separatism 
would also vanish.  Nations such as Ukraine would voluntarily become part of the Soviet 
state, and socialism would reign.   A debate among the Bolsheviks centered on 
nationalism, and before it could be resolved, Lenin died.  His successor, Joseph Stalin, 
did not share Lenin’s views on nationalism.  He believed in a more coercive approach. 
Under Stalin, “the main stress in the Communist interpretation of autonomy was 
on closer ties between the borderlands and Russia and on the enhancement of the 
authority and prestige of the Soviet regime...[A]utonomy was considered as an instrument 
of consolidation, not of decentralization.”104  Soviet Commissariats were placed in 
charge of Ukraine, and they subjugated the local Ukrainian representatives.  Control of 
Ukraine was essentially located in Moscow. The Commissariats showed utter disrespect 
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for Ukrainian sovereignty and the constitutional rights of the Ukrainian people.  When 
Ukraine formally protested to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU), Stalin brushed these complaints aside as exaggerations or minor 
infractions.  This was the beginning of severe Ukrainian hardship under Soviet rule.  
According to Lieven: 
It was in the Soviet period that Ukraine experienced its greatest sufferings 
of modern times: the terrible famine of 1933, induced by Stalin’s 
Communist regime to break peasant resistance to collectivization (and 
also, to a lesser extent, nationalist opposition to Soviet rule); the purges of 
the 1930s, which wiped out both the Ukrainian leadership which had 
fostered the national revival of the 1920s and a very large part of the 
Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia; the horrors of the Second World War and 
the Nazi occupation; and the Stalinist repression of western Ukraine which 
followed.105   
In Ukraine, the period of collectivization and massive famine imposed by Stalin is 
referred to as the “Holodmor.”  By some estimates, the number of dead was close to four 
million. This period has been characterized by some as “a genocide of the Ukrainian 
people.”106  During World War II, many Ukrainian citizens did not even show any 
hostility to the invading German Army.  “As the Germans advanced…into Ukraine, 
civilians often welcomed them as liberators…they hoped for the dissolution of the 
kolkhozes and the reopening of the churches, and national liberation as well.”107  The 
war ended with Ukraine under Soviet control again, and Stalin continued to brutally 
repress Ukrainian nationalism. 
Despite the death of Stalin in 1953, Ukrainian nationalism continued to be 
repressed under Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev.  “Among non-Russian 
nationalists…the name of Khrushchev was mud.  In Kiev, where he had spent many 
years, he was detested for restricting the expression of Ukrainian national pride.”108  
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Some concessions were made, such as transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954.  “Yet the 
authorities curtailed and controlled the public expression of nationhood…Too much 
concession to national feeling might encourage separatist aspirations, and Ukraine’s very 
size – it contained the largest non-independent nation in Europe – would endanger the 
USSR’s integrity if a national movement got out of hand.”109  In the 1970s, Brezhnev 
repressed border nationalism in Ukraine by arresting the leading national dissidents.  So, 
under Soviet rule, Ukraine was continually repressed.  This effectively “pushed” the 
Ukrainians further away from their “big brothers” to the East, as the Russians would like 
to think of themselves.   
However, due to a drastic decline in the economy and an ecological disaster, the 
nationalist forces in Ukraine made serious headway to independence in the 1980s.  
According to the historian Martin Malia:   
[T]his multinational empire [the USSR] remained stable as long as the 
economy was able to support a strong central state…[Economic] 
stagnation was undermining the republics just as it was eating away at the 
rest of the system…Chernobyl, in particular, accelerated the development 
of Ukrainian and Belorussian separatist sentiment; and the local apparats 
easily found it in their interests to espouse this sentiment against Moscow.  
Moreover, the decline of the economy made resources scarcer and 
therefore increased competition for them, both among the republics and 
between the republics and the center.  The consequence of this 
accumulation of grievances was a growing movement for local control as 
the only appropriate “restructuring” for the national republics.  And 
glasnost for the first time made it possible to talk about all of this without 
undue fear of reprisal.110  
Through perestroika and glasnost, Mikhail Gorbachev’s goals were to restructure 
the Soviet economy and make governmental institutions more transparent.  However, 
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observed, “The tragedy of Soviet nationality policy was that it encouraged the 
development of national identity while at the same time giving the energies thereby 
generated only a fraudulent outlet.”111   
In December 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the USSR) dissolved 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed.  In Malia’s words, “The 
coup de grâce came in December [1991], when Ukraine confirmed its parliament’s earlier 
declaration of independence in a referendum, thereby in effect ending the Union.”112  
Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly in favor of distancing themselves from Russian 
influence.  “Over 90 percent of voters, including those in heavily Russian-populated areas 
of the republic, voted in favor of Ukrainian independence.  Subsequent analyses show 
that the majority of voters in Ukraine came to support independence because they 
believed that a separate existence from the USSR might be the best guarantee for their 
economic well-being.”26  Although Ukraine gained its independence in December 1991, 
the euphoric feelings did not last.  Corruption and economic deterioration prevailed 
throughout the 1990s in Ukraine.   According to Ilya Prizel, Research Professor of East 
European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh: 
The Kiev-based nomenklatura, no longer subject to outside supervision, 
absent a political challenge from within, and with no pretence of 
ideological commitment, went on a binge of corruption and asset-stripping 
of unprecedented proportions, making Ukraine the most corrupt country in 
the CIS…[T]he “rent” collected by the elite in 1992 achieved parity with 
the country’s GDP.113  
Despite the economic degradation throughout the 1990s, “Ukraine managed to 
extract generous benefits from its relationship with Russia…Given the importance that 
Boris Yeltsin attached to Ukraine’s participation in the structures of the CIS and given 
the symbiotic links between the elites in Russia and in Ukraine, Yeltsin continued to 
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allow Ukraine to build up a huge debt to Russia.”114  Energy was imported at subsidized 
prices from Russia or stolen from natural gas pipelines crossing Ukrainian territory.  
Sometimes it was resold on the world market for vast profits.   
Russia’s “benevolent” treatment of independent Ukraine was unusual, and 
Kravchuk recognized Russia’s ulterior motive.  “We want friendly relations with Russia, 
but Russia considers us to be her vassal and as her vassal we are expected to submit and 
agree.”115  To prevent Ukraine from becoming reliant on Russia again, Kravchuk and his 
successor, Leonid Kuchma, looked to the West for support.  “During the first decade of 
independence…Ukraine managed, despite obvious corruption, mismanagement, and 
crude expropriation of foreign investors’ assets to become the third largest beneficiary of 
U.S. aid.”116   
During the 1990s, both Ukrainian presidents made favorable statements regarding 
NATO.  Kravchuk spoke of eventual membership in the Alliance, while Kuchma spoke 
of NATO providing stability in the region.  As noted in Chapter II, Kravchuk stated that 
“the best guarantee to Ukraine’s security would be membership to NATO.”117 
Furthermore, Kuchma told President Clinton in May 1995 that “he believed NATO 
would be a guarantor for stability in Europe, and that Kyiv was no longer against NATO 
enlargement.”118  The fear of Ukraine again being subjugated to Russian rule most likely 
influenced their views regarding the benefits NATO could offer.   However, the 
Ukrainian government decided to pursue a policy of mnogovektornost: a “multi-vector” 
policy that placed equal emphasis on relations with Russia and the West.119   
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Aspects of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine changed when Vladimir 
Putin became the Russian president in 1999.  In 2001 President Kuchma described the 
modification in the relationship when he stated that “Mr. Putin pursues a very strict 
economic policy towards Ukraine, very strict, too pragmatic.  With Yeltsin you could 
reach an agreement, but with Putin it’s cash upfront.”120  As Prizel has observed, “[I]n 
the post-1998 era the Russian elite had neither the means nor the motivation to continue 
to subsidize Russia’s erstwhile empire.”121  After cutting off the Yeltsin “free” loans, 
Putin re-introduced Russia’s subjugation tendencies towards Ukraine via economic 
power.  His goal was to make Ukraine economically dependent on Russia for political 
purposes: 
Since 1999 Russia has become Ukraine’s largest trading partner, investor, 
and creditor by far.  Russian enterprises have acquired key sectors of 
Ukraine’s metal and chemical industries, and Russia has undertaken the 
financing of Ukraine’s program of nuclear power plant construction.   
While Moscow took a very accommodating position on the settling of 
Ukraine’s debt, this flexibility was accompanied by a visible increase in 
Russian influence on Ukraine’s political posture both in terms of 
economic and foreign policy.122   
Energy dependence became the main source of Russian influence on Ukraine 
after Putin took office.  “On becoming Acting President of the Russian Federation in 
December 1999, Vladimir Putin cut the supply of oil to Ukraine for the fifth time since 
1991.  The taps stayed off until April 2000, when President Kuchma took the first steps to 
meet Putin’s political demands.”123  Instances such as this are an influential cause of 
Ukraine seeking security guarantees from the West through institutions such as NATO.    
Steven Woehrel of the Congressional Research Service has described Ukraine’s 
dependence on Russian energy as follows: 
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Although it possesses modest oil and natural gas reserves of its own, 
Ukraine is dependent upon Russia for most of its oil and natural gas…In 
2004, these imports account for 80 percent of Ukraine’s oil consumption 
and 78 percent of its natural gas consumption.  Natural gas accounts for 
half of Ukraine’s energy usage.  Most Ukrainian homes are heated by 
natural gas.  Ukraine’s steel and other heavy industries, which play a key 
role in Ukraine’s exports, are highly inefficient users of energy.124   
Russian state-owned energy firms have raised prices dramatically over the years, 
and Ukraine has accumulated a sizable debt to Russia.  “For years Ukraine has been hard-
pressed to pay its debts to Gazprom and has regularly been indebted to Gazprom to the 
tune of about $1 billion per year.”125   At times, energy has been cut off when Ukraine 
has defaulted on these payments.  “Russia has been painted as ‘bullying’ Ukraine…by 
demanding higher prices for the natural gas being delivered…in an attempt to get them to 
submit to Moscow’s political rule.”126  
Of particular note, energy prices and disputes have increased dramatically since 
the 2004 “Orange Revolution,” when Viktor Yushchenko won the presidency.  Russian 
President Vladimir Putin overtly supported Yuschenko’s rival, Viktor Yanukovych, and 
reacted angrily at the success of the Orange Revolution.127  The Russian leadership was 
accused of assisting the Kuchma regime in conducting fraudulent elections, and of 
deploying Russian spetsnaz (special forces) units to parts of Ukraine in order to cause 
division and turbulence within the country.128  These actions angered many Ukrainians, 
and likely assisted the pro-Western Yushchenko in winning the presidency.  
Subsequently, after Yushchenko took office, Gazprom, the Russian government-
controlled gas monopoly, began to demand sharp increases in the price of natural gas 
supplied to Ukraine.  
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[I]n January 2006…Gazprom insisted on a more than fourfold increase in 
the price that it charges Ukraine for natural gas.  When Ukraine balked at 
the demand, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine…leading also 
to cuts in gas supplies to Western Europe.  The gas supplies were restored 
two days later after a new gas supply agreement was signed.  In early 
2007, with the more pro-Russian Yanukovych government in power, 
Russia and Ukraine agreed to gradually increase the price of Russian 
natural gas to Ukraine over the next five years, at which time it will reach 
the world market price.129 
However, with the election of a pro-Western government headed by Yulia 
Tymoshenko in December 2007, natural gas disputes resurfaced.  In March 2008, soon 
after her election as Prime Minister, Russia threatened to shut off natural gas supplies to 
Ukraine.  The dispute was complicated.  Quentin Peel, international affairs editor of the 
Financial Times, noted that: 
[I]t is not so simple.  Gazprom wants a stake in the Ukrainian market via 
an intermediary [RosUkrEnergo], and Yulia Tymoshenko, the Ukrainian 
Prime Minister who made a fortune in the gas business, wants to keep it 
out…And behind that spat lies the more fundamental problem: the 
Russians do not regard Ukraine as a serious independent country and the 
Ukrainians do not regard the Russians as trustworthy commercial 
counterparts.  This is not just about gas.  It is about sovereignty, respect 
and a lack of transparency in dealing with a very large amount of 
money.130  
Coincidentally, just before this dispute, Ukrainian officials took a bold step 
toward NATO membership.  As noted in Chapter II, in January 2008, “President Viktor 
Yushchenko, Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk and PM [Prime Minister] Yulia Tymoshenko 
wrote a letter to the NATO Secretary General to confirm Ukraine’s effort to join NATO 
MAP.”131  It appears that Russia is consistently using energy prices as a tool to cause 
political turmoil and destabilize Ukraine.  Speaking about the Russian interference and its 
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effects on Ukrainian politics, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, chief of the SBU, the state 
security service, stated, “We are a young country.  For any country it is dangerous when 
domestic politics is being interfered with by foreign sources.”132 
Other forms of economic pressure may be applied by Russia on Ukraine.  Russia 
is Ukraine’s largest trading partner.  In recent years, key areas of Russian-Ukrainian trade 
have declined, such as military-technological cooperation.  This has further “pushed” 
Ukraine away from Russia and has resulted in closer economic ties between Ukraine and 
the West.   
The Ukrainian Prime Minister reported in March [2007] that military-
technological cooperation with Russia has been declining from year to 
year.  Both countries are looking for partners and potential customers 
elsewhere…After the election victory in 2004 of Viktor Yushchenko’s 
pro-Western coalition, Moscow became determined to create a new 
generation of armaments based on its own technological base and in 
association with either reliable partners within the CIS, or under strategic 
partnership arrangements with such major arms-importing customers as 
India or China.133 
Speaking about Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO, Sergey Ivanov, then 
Russia’s Defense Minister, stated in 2006: “Regardless of whether we want this or not, it 
will have an inevitable impact one way or another on our relations, particularly on 
cooperation in the military-industrial sector and some other sectors.”134  Energy disputes, 
decreased trade and Russian rhetoric will continue to “push” Ukraine away from Russia. 
According to James Sherr: 
Ukraine’s fundamental problem with Russia remains.  Its formal 
independence, its nezavisimost’, has been eminently acceptable to Russia’s 
largely pragmatic elites.  But its samostoyatel’nost’—its ‘ability to stand’ 
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possibility and as a basis for cooperation.  In the Yeltsin years, 
cooperation was predicated on integration; under Putin, it has been 
predicated on recognition of Russia’s primacy.135 
Russian nationalism and chauvinism have forced Ukraine to react.  Membership 
in NATO could bolster its position vis à vis Russia.  Throughout the first decade of 
independence, Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma stressed that expansion of NATO had to 
take Russian opinions into account.  However, President Yushchenko does not feel 
obligated to do likewise.   
Despite centuries of subjugating Ukraine politically, socially and economically, 
Russia feels betrayed that Ukraine is seeking membership in NATO.  Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov stated that “the acceptance into NATO of Ukraine…will mean a colossal 
geopolitical shift, and we assess such steps from the point of view of our interests.”136  
Soon after these comments, “by a vote of 435 to 0…the [Russian] State Duma adopted a 
resolution criticizing Ukraine’s plans to join NATO and stating that this would ‘lead to 
very negative consequences for relations between our fraternal peoples.’”137  
Many Russians share this fraternal sense of betrayal.  Victor Kremenyuk, the 
deputy director of the Institute for North American studies at the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, stated “Historically, both peoples were one nation with one language, one 
religion, one culture.”138 According to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, NATO expansion “was 
especially painful in the case of Ukraine, a country whose closeness to Russia is defined 
by literally millions of family ties among our peoples, relatives living on different sides 
of the national border.  At one fell stroke, these families could be torn apart by a new 
dividing line, the border of a military bloc.”139 
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Another dimension of the Russian sense of betrayal is geographical in nature.  
Many Russians believe that the territory occupied by present-day Ukraine is a result of 
Russian territorial expansion.  “In Moscow’s view, contemporary Ukraine’s border—
drawn by Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev as an administrative frontier between 
Soviet provinces—stretched far beyond historical Ukraine’s outer limits, incorporating 
millions of Russians and creating ethnic, linguistic, and political tensions.”140  The 
territory “gained” by Ukraine under Soviet rule included resource-rich areas such as 
Donetsk, known for its coal deposits, and the Crimean Peninsula, which was “presented” 
(some Russians say illegally) to Ukraine in 1954 by Khrushchev and which is home to 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet.   
Russia’s hostile view of NATO expansion into former Soviet republics, combined 
with Ukraine’s “betrayal” by seeking membership in NATO, could result in several 
outcomes.141 “On February 14, 2008, in response to a question about possible Ukrainian 
membership in NATO, President Putin warned that Russia might be forced to take 
military countermeasures, including aiming missiles against Ukraine, if Kiev hosted 
foreign bases or joined the U.S. missile defense project.”142  According to James Sherr, 
“The prospect of NATO membership for Ukraine…would be deeply disturbing to 
Russia’s Armed Forces.”143  Russian leaders view NATO expansion eastward as an 
encirclement of Russia by NATO.  Dmitri Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, stated in 2006 
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Russian military leaders have in the recent past viewed NATO as the major threat 
to their national security.  “Throughout the 1990s, Russia’s top military leaders 
stubbornly clung to their position that NATO was the greatest threat to the homeland.”145  
Some of this thinking may still exist in the Russian leadership today.  In April 2008, 
“Chief of the Russian General Staff Yuriy Baluyevsky warned that Russia would take 
military and ‘other measures’ if Ukraine joined NATO.”146  In August 2008, the Russian 
military invaded Georgia, a former Soviet republic seeking NATO membership.  This 
prompted Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, to say that 
“[Prime Minister] Putin’s next target will be Ukraine.”147 
In addition to aiming missiles at Ukraine or utilizing military force, Russia could 
provoke pro-Russian elements of Ukrainian society to incite conflict by encouraging 
autonomy or separation from Ukraine.  The most likely targets of such a provocation 
would be in Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula, both of which have a large 
proportion of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians among their populations.   
This is consistent with comments that Vladimir Putin, then still president, made at the 
April 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit:  
Putin warned that if Georgia and Ukraine moved toward NATO 
membership, Russia might respond by recognizing Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia’s secession from Georgia and by instigating a partition of Ukraine. 
According to a witness account, Putin told Bush that Ukraine was “not a 
real nation,” that much of its territory had been "given away" by Russia, 
and that Ukraine would “cease to exist as a state” if it joined NATO. In 
that case, Putin hinted, Russia would encourage secession of the Crimea 
and eastern regions of Ukraine.148 
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Putin went on to discuss “how present-day Ukraine, in its current borders, was 
formed, [and recalled] the contradictions between western Ukraine and its eastern and 
southeastern regions. He said that what was being done to draw Ukraine into NATO 
would not facilitate the important task of helping Ukraine maintain its unity.”149  
According to James Sherr, “Eastern Ukraine is a region that many in the West 
have considered lost and that many more in Russia have considered nash (ours).”150  
However, Sherr explains that the threat of the secession of eastern Ukraine is a distant 
prospect for two reasons.  “First, it was plainly a manoeuvre from the top which lacked 
grass roots support.  Second, the Donetsk power structures themselves, who are in sharp 
competition with Russian business interests, understand that secession would make them 
almost entirely dependent on Russia.”151  In sum, the attitude of eastern Ukrainians is 
sympathetic to the Russian people and culture, not to the Russian government.  After 
centuries of suppression, they prefer their Ukrainian sovereignty over a return to Russian 
economic, social and political subjugation.   
The Crimean peninsula, on the other hand, may be a different matter. In the words 
of Anatol Lieven, “the emotional and political problems surrounding Sevastopol and 
Crimea are rather different from problems related to other Ukrainian regions, and they 
give rise to different dangers.”152  The danger that Lieven refers to is the possibility of 
Crimean secession from Ukraine.  In July 2008, Leonid Grach, the Crimean KPU 
(Ukrainian Communist Party) leader, “threatened to support the peninsula’s secession 
from Ukraine if it joined NATO.”153   
Crimea is an emotional issue for Russians.  According to Stuart Goldman, a 
specialist in Russian and Eurasian affairs for the Congressional Research Service: 
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Many Russians view it [Crimea] as historically part of Russia, and say it 
was illegally “given” to Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954…In April 1992, 
the Russian legislature declared the 1954 transfer of Crimea illegal.  Later 
that year Russia and Ukraine agreed that Crimea was “an integral part of 
Ukraine” but would have economic autonomy and the right to enter into 
social, economic, and cultural relations with other states.154  
Crimea in fact retains strong ties to Russia economically, socially and politically.  
The Crimean economy is dependent on Russia for trade and tourism.  Also, a majority of 
the Crimean population consists of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians 
who are sympathetic to Russia.  The combination of these factors exacerbates tensions 
between Crimea and Kyiv when the issue of NATO membership is discussed by the 
government.  As discussed in Chapter II, Crimea and Sevastopol in particular have been 
home to numerous anti-NATO protests.  There have been multiple protests of the annual 
multinational military exercise hosted by Ukraine in Crimea named “Sea Breeze.”  In 
May 2008, “Anti-NATO activists attacked a pro-NATO rally in Simferopol, the capital of 
Crimea…demolishing the opponents’ tents, throwing eggs, and pouring milk and juice 
over them.  The anti-NATO mob also burned a NATO flag before TV cameras.”155  
Furthermore, the Simferopol city council issued an edict in July 2008 declaring 
Simferopol a “territory free from NATO.”156   
After the Russian military invaded Georgia in August 2008, Pavel Korduban, an 
analyst for the Eurasia region with the Jamestown Foundation, stated that “In theory, 
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Ukraine, like it did in South Ossetia [M]any Crimean residents also reportedly have 
Russian citizenship.  It has been claimed that Russian citizenship has been extended to as 
many as 170,000 Crimean residents.”157 
As mentioned previously, Sevastopol is also home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.   
In 1997, an agreement was reached between Ukraine and Russia for the fleet to remain in 
Sevastopol until 2017, with Russia leasing the port facilities from Ukraine.  However, 
according to Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, a commander in the Russian Navy, “Russia has 
never made a secret of its desire to retain its presence in Sevastopol after 2017.”158  
President Yushchenko is adamant that Russia remove its Black Sea fleet at the expiration 
of its lease in 2017.  In July 2008, he stated that “The start of negotiations on the removal 
of Russia’s Black Sea fleet from Ukrainian territory should be included in the agenda of 
our relations.”159   
The debate over the presence of the Russian fleet has intensified since the August 
2008 Russian invasion of Georgia.  When Russian Navy ships were sent from Sevastopol 
to Abkhazia’s coast, Ukrainian officials warned that Kyiv might take measures to prevent 
the ships from returning to their base in Sevastopol.  Later, however, this threat was 
withdrawn by a Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman.160 “Yushchenko subsequently 
issued a controversial decree apparently aimed both at saving face for Kyiv and at 
avoiding open confrontation with Russia.  The decree required the RBSF [Russian Black 
Sea Fleet] to agree on any future movement of its ships with the Ukrainian Foreign 
Ministry.  Russia rejected the decree.”161 
Some analysts believe that the Russian Black Sea fleet’s presence in Crimea is a 
key issue in determining whether NATO will accept Ukraine’s bid for membership.  
According to Steve Larrabee of the Rand Corporation, “Russians want to keep their fleet 
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there to maintain the presence, which in a way is a kind of leverage to exert on Ukraine 
and to keep their finger on the pulse.  As long as the [Russian] fleet is there, there’s little 
likelihood that NATO would bring Ukraine into the alliance…Most of the [NATO] 
members would be afraid to bring Ukraine there with the Russian presence on Ukrainian 
soil.”162  NATO is aware of the symbolic importance that Russia places on Crimea, and 
is careful not to underestimate this.  “Markian Bilynskyj, vice president of the U.S.-
Ukraine Foundation, says Russia’s naval presence in Ukraine is potentially more divisive 
than U.S. plans to set up a missile defense [system] in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
both NATO members.”163 
The Sevastopol port could offer NATO a strategic location for its assets.  
According to John Daly, a Eurasian foreign affairs and defense policy analyst for the 
Jamestown Foundation, “If Ukraine joins NATO, well, the alliance gets access to a port 
on Russia’s underbelly.”164  However, Russia and pro-Russian elements in Crimea are 
adamant about Crimea staying out of NATO, even if it means secession.   
Another possible, and the most likely, Russian response to Ukrainian membership 
in NATO is to exploit the close economic ties between the two countries.  According to 
James Sherr, Ukraine is “in a weak position vis à vis Russia, which continues to use the 
gas price as a lever to extract strategic concessions.”165 By January 2009, Ukraine will 
most likely be paying Russia’s Gazprom $400 per 1,000 cubic meters for natural gas.  It 
currently pays $179 per 1,000 cubic meters.166 The issue is whether Ukraine can afford 




162 Korenovska, B1. 
163 Ibid., B1. 
164 Ibid., B1. 
165 Sherr, Ukraine: Prospects and Risks, 1. 
166 Roman Kupchinsky, “Is Ukraine on the Brink of an Energy Crisis?” Eurasia Daily Monitor 5:144 
(29 July 2008). Available from http://www.jamestown.org/edm (accessed 12 September 2008).  
  47
                                                
In June 2008, Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko had a meeting with Russian 
Prime Minister Putin to discuss the price increase of natural gas.  At this meeting, “Putin 
promised to distribute the price increase over a five-year span.”167  During this period, 
Ukraine could conceivably improve upon its energy-inefficient ways or seek alternative 
sources of energy in response to the price increase.  However, if the Ukrainian 
government continues its pro-NATO policies, Russia could respond by cutting off natural 
gas supplies to Ukraine or sharply increasing the price, as it did in 2006.  Another sharp 
price increase could significantly affect the Ukrainian political situation, since 
presidential elections are slated for 2009.  According to Roman Kupchinsky, a Eurasian 
affairs analyst for the Jamestown Foundation: 
Nonetheless, if the increase is not modified, Viktor Yanukovych, the 
leader of the Party of the Regions, will in all probability benefit most and 
be elected president. Gazprom and the Kremlin might be tempted to play 
the “gas card” in order to see Yanukovych elected and to gain control — if 
not direct ownership — of the Ukrainian trunk gas pipeline, a long-time 
objective of Russian policy…With a possible debt of over $10 billion by 
late 2009, the new Ukrainian government might be forced to sell the 
pipeline to Gazprom — as well as a substantial part of its industrial base, 
maintain the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and renounce its 
intention to join NATO.168 
Such a geopolitical move would be consistent with past actions by the Russian 
government, and it would be consistent with official Russian policy.  “The first paragraph 
of the official (2003) Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 defines the 
country’s fuel and energy complex as an ‘instrument for the conduct of internal and 
external policy’, adding that ‘the role of the country in world energy markets to a large 
extent determines its geopolitical influence’.”169   
On the other hand, such a move could further push some pro-Russian elements of 
the population away from Russian influence.  “Voters in Eastern Ukraine could lose some 
 
 
167 Kupchinsky, “Is Ukraine on the Brink of an Energy Crisis?” 
168 Ibid. 
169 Sherr, At the Crossroads or the Precipice? The Fate of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and its 
Implications for Europe,” 6. 
  48
                                                
of their pro-Russian enthusiasm if higher gas prices lead to wide-scale unemployment in 
their region.  Some would place the blame on Russia for ‘squeezing’ Ukraine — and 
them — into an economic crisis.”170 
Another possible Russian response could be ultimate acceptance of Ukrainian 
membership in NATO.  According to Paul Gallis of the Congressional Research Service:  
[A]fter complaining loudly, Russia would grudgingly accept NATO 
membership for Ukraine, as it did in the case of the Baltic states, Poland, 
and other countries in Central Europe.  Many observers believe that this 
outcome may be less likely due to the particular sensitivity of Ukraine to 
Russians, many of whom believe the country should be closely tied to 
Russia, as much of it has been from the 17th century until 1991.171 
Such a response would not be consistent with chauvinistic Russian actions toward 
Ukraine in the past.  Nor would it be consistent with the views of the current Russian 
President, Dmitry Medvedev.  He stated in June 2008 that if NATO further expanded its 
membership in Eastern Europe, “There would not be confrontation, but the price would 
be high.”172  
In conclusion, centuries of Russian economic, social, and political subjugation 
have stiffened the resolve of Ukraine to seek integration with the West.  NATO 
membership is a key foreign policy goal of the current Yushchenko government.  
“Ukraine defines a ‘European choice’ as the central pillar of its foreign policy, but it is 
constrained by a legacy of backwardness, and by a complex relationship with its Russian 
neighbor.”173   
Russia adamantly opposes NATO membership for Ukraine, and will most likely 
apply further economic, social or political pressure against Ukraine if its government 
continues to pursue membership against Russian wishes.  At the April 2008 NATO 
Bucharest Summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia would do 
 
170 Kupchinsky, “Is Ukraine on the Brink of an Energy Crisis?” 
171 Gallis, Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, 26. 
172 Hugh Williamson, “Medvedev takes tough line on global security,” Financial Times, 6 June 2008, 
6. Available from: www.proquest.umi.com (accessed 9 July 2008). 
173 Craig Nation, NATO’s Relations with Russia and Ukraine (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2000), 5. 
  49
                                                
“everything possible” to prevent NATO membership for Ukraine.174  Possible scenarios 
include military countermeasures, energy and trade restrictions or cutoffs, or the 
instigation of the partitioning of Ukraine.  One final scenario, not discussed in this 
chapter, could involve Russia putting pressure on NATO members not to extend 
membership to Ukraine.  This possibility, and the influence of NATO members on 
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IV. THE NATO INFLUENCE ON UKRAINE’S NATO 
ASPIRATION 
As mentioned previously, Ukraine has a résumé of achievements in its dealings 
with NATO.  Relations formally began in 1991, when Ukraine became a founding 
member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which became the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.   In 1994, Ukraine became the first 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member to join NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP).175  As long ago as 1997, Tor Bukkvoll, a Norwegian scholar, wrote that 
“Ukraine is giving high priority to participation in the PfP program and is considered to 
be one of the most eager participants.”176 The Ukrainian military has participated in 
notable PfP exercises such as: “Cooperative Osprey,” “The Shield of Peace,” 
“Cooperative Neighbor” and “Sea Breeze.”  Also, Ukrainian peacekeepers were active in 
the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations 
in Bosnia, and Ukrainian troops are participating in the NATO-led Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) operation.   
Ukraine’s relationship with NATO was strengthened with the signing of the 
“Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” in 1997.  This 
Charter “established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and identified areas for 
consultation and cooperation.”177  The NATO website explains the importance of the 
NUC: 
The NATO-Ukraine Commission, established by the Charter, has served 
as a forum for regular consultations on issues of mutual interest.  The 
Commission has provided a valuable framework for the development of 
mutually beneficial practical defence and military, scientific, 
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environmental and economic cooperation.  This cooperative format has 
allowed Ukraine to benefit from NATO’s experience and assistance in the 
conduct of ambitious reforms.178 
Furthermore, a “NATO-Ukraine Action Plan” was adopted in November 2002.  
Grigoriy M. Perepelytsia, a Ukrainian expert, explained the significance of the Action 
Plan as follows: 
The Action Plan aims to deepen and broaden the NATO-Ukraine 
relationship and to support Ukraine’s reform efforts on the road towards 
full integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.  It sets out specific objectives, 
covering political and economic issues; security, defence and military 
issues; information issues; and legal issues.  These objectives are 
supported by Annual Target Plans in which Ukraine sets its own targets 
for the activities it intends to pursue both internally and in cooperation 
with NATO.  The Action Plan itself will not lead directly to membership.  
However, its successful implementation is regarded as a precursor to an 
invitation to join NATO’s Membership Action Plan, and would help 
Ukraine move towards meeting the requirements expected of a candidate 
for NATO membership.179    
Another milestone for NATO-Ukraine relations occurred in April 2005, soon after 
the “Orange Revolution.”  An “Intensified Dialogue” on NATO membership for Ukraine 
was launched, coinciding with a package of short-term actions to enhance NATO-
Ukraine cooperation.  In Perepelytsia’s words: 
The aim of this [Intensified] dialogue is to give Ukrainian officials the 
opportunity to learn more about what would be expected of Ukraine as a 
potential member of the Alliance, while simultaneously letting NATO 
examine Ukrainian reforms and capabilities.  In parallel with the launch of 
the Intensified Dialogue, the Ukrainian and Allied foreign ministers 
agreed [upon] a package of short-term actions to help Ukraine in moving 
the reform process forward.  This package covered a range of areas.180 
According to the NATO website, this package included: strengthening democratic 
institutions, renewing political dialogue, reinvigorating cooperation in defense and 
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security reform, improving and targeting public diplomacy efforts, and enhancing support 
to address the socio-economic impact of defense reform.181 
The next step for Ukraine is to receive a Membership Application Plan (MAP) 
from NATO.  A MAP is a major achievement for an aspiring country.  As noted in 
Chapter II, Perepelytsia has put the importance of a NATO MAP into perspective: 
In the MAP framework, Annual National Programmes are developed 
which focus on a number of requirements for aspirant countries, including 
in the political, economic, resource, legal and security fields.  Aspirant 
countries are expected to demonstrate a functioning democratic political 
system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority 
populations; commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes with 
neighbours; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to 
the Alliance; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and 
structures.182 
Steven Pifer, a senior advisor for the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, offers another perspective regarding a NATO MAP: 
Membership action plans thus serve as roadmaps to guide prospective 
NATO members.  The process is open-ended: there is no fixed schedule 
for completing it, and receiving a MAP does not guarantee an automatic 
invitation for membership.  The decision to extend an invitation is a 
separate political decision, taken by Alliance members after they have 
reviewed a country’s progress on its MAP.  A MAP process aims to create 
the preconditions for consideration of membership.  While the 
presumption is that it will lead to membership, a MAP does not prejudge a 
country’s decision on extending an invitation.183   
At the April 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, the Ukrainian government hoped to 
receive a NATO MAP.  However, the NATO Allies chose not to offer a MAP to 
Ukraine.Still, the Allies expressed support for Ukraine’s MAP application, and offered 
encouraging comments about Ukraine’s NATO bid.  Regarding Ukraine’s membership 
aspirations, NATO officials issued the following statement at the Bucharest Summit: 
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NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for 
membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become 
members of NATO.  Both nations have made valuable contributions to 
Alliance operations.  We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and 
Georgia…MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct 
way to membership.  Today we make clear that we support these 
countries’ applications for MAP.  Therefore we will now begin a period of 
intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the 
questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.  We have 
asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their 
December 2008 meeting.  Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide 
on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.184 
This declaration was a large step forward for Ukraine’s membership prospects, 
particularly when compared to the statement issued at the 2006 NATO Riga Summit.  In 
the Riga Summit Declaration the Allies reaffirmed the importance of the NATO-Ukraine 
Distinctive Partnership, and thanked Ukraine for its participation in NATO-led operations 
and its efforts to promote regional cooperation.  The Allies also promised to continue to 
assist Ukraine with its reform efforts.185  However, the Bucharest Summit Declaration all 
but assured Ukraine NATO membership at some point with the statement: “We agreed 
today that these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO.”186   
Still, despite its résumé of achievements and cooperation with NATO, Ukraine 
was not offered MAP status at the Bucharest Summit.  In spite of strong U.S. support for 
Ukraine’s MAP application, “Key European NATO Allies were reluctant to consider a 
MAP for Ukraine because they feel that Ukraine’s qualifications for a MAP are weak, 
and in part because they are concerned about damaging relations with Russia.”187   
Germany and France in particular are “key” European Allies who oppose a NATO MAP 
for Ukraine in current circumstances.  “On March 6 [2008], German Foreign Minister 
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Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, ‘I cannot hide my skepticism’ about Ukraine’s chances for 
a MAP.  At the [March 2008] NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner and other European leaders stressed the need for maintaining 
good relations with Moscow.”188 
According to a study published by the Brookings Institution in 2008: 
In the end, a number of European members blocked consensus [for 
Ukraine’s MAP] for three reasons: (1) the low level of public support in 
Ukraine for joining NATO: (2) the strained cohabitation between 
President Yushchenko and the presidential administration, on the one 
hand, and Prime Minister Tymoshenko and the cabinet, on the other; and 
(3) the possible Russian reaction.189 
Therefore, it appears that some members of the Alliance do not believe Ukraine is 
ready for NATO membership, while some members do not wish to provoke negative 
Russian reactions.   
A. ALLEGEDLY WEAK QUALIFICATIONS 
Allegedly “weak qualifications,” from the viewpoint of some NATO Allies, 
appear to have been a factor in their decision-making about Ukraine receiving a MAP.  
Steven Pifer noted the qualifications that NATO members examine prior to granting 
membership to an aspiring country: 
Since launching the enlargement process in the 1990s, NATO has asked 
two sets of questions of prospective members. First, has the country in 
question implemented the political, economic, military and security 
reforms necessary to bring it into compliance with NATO standards?  Has 
the country’s political-economic system embraced the democratic and 
market economy values of the Alliance? This reflects the fact that NATO 
is not just a security alliance but is also an alliance of shared values.  
Second, can the country make a contribution to Euro-Atlantic security? 
Does it have the capabilities and the political will to use them that will 
strengthen the Alliance’s ability to meet the challenges currently before 
it?190  
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Pifer believes that Ukraine presents a persuasive case for obtaining a MAP.  
Regarding its political situation, he states that 
It [Ukraine] has implemented significant reforms since regaining 
independence in 1991.  As for political transformation, Ukraine is the only 
former Soviet state other than the Baltic nations to achieve a Freedom 
House ranking of “free,” which it did in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
Democratic elections have become the norm.  Ukraine has held three 
national ballots over the past three years…that were assessed by 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other 
monitors to be free, fair and competitive…The country, moreover, boasts 
an increasingly professional and independent media that is unafraid to 
challenge power.  Non-governmental organizations have flourished and 
have had real impact. 
The statements by Pifer make a positive case for Ukraine.  However, as noted in 
Chapter II, issues in the political sphere constitute one of the main factors inhibiting 
Ukraine’s NATO aspiration. Corruption is still a major problem in Ukraine.  
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Ukraine 118 out of 
179 countries.191  Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter II, Janusz Bugajski, director of 
the New European Democracies Project at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, has identified four areas of governance in which Ukraine must make progress to 
support its pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration.  These four areas are constitutional 
reform, judicial reform, administrative reform, and greater transparency and 
responsiveness.192  
Also, political instability in the Ukrainian government may prevent Ukraine from 
receiving a MAP.  In September 2008, President Yushchenko’s party, Our Ukraine-
People’s Self Defense, withdrew from a coalition with Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s party, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, after disagreements over domestic and 
international policies. As Pavel Korduban, an analyst for the Eurasia region with the 
Jamestown Foundation, pointed out, “If no new coalition emerges within 30 days, 
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Yushchenko will be entitled to disband parliament and call a new election.”193  On 9 
October 2008, Yushchenko followed through and disbanded the Ukrainian parliament.  A 
new parliamentary election will be held in December 2008, which will be the third such 
election since the 2004 Orange Revolution.   
Yushchenko’s popularity is declining among Ukrainians.  As a result, the Party of 
Regions, headed by Viktor Yanukovych, may gain more seats in parliament in a new 
election.  The Party of Regions is already Ukraine’s biggest political party, and largely 
opposes NATO membership. Yanukovych has stated that the Ukrainian parliament will 
not consider legislation for NATO membership until a public referendum has approved 
the pursuit of this membership.194  A poll conducted in May 2008 by the Kyiv-based 
Sofia think-tank “showed that only 21.4 percent of Ukrainians are inclined to support 
NATO membership and 53 percent of those polled approved of the April failure to secure 
a MAP.”195   
The disintegration of Ukraine’s ruling coalition in September 2008 and 
consistently low domestic support for NATO membership will continue to send the signal 
to NATO members that Ukraine is not ready for a MAP. These setbacks may reinforce 
their reasons for not granting Ukraine a MAP in Bucharest. 
According to Pifer, another factor that NATO Allies consider in their decision to 
grant membership to an aspiring country is the ability of that country’s economy to 
integrate with NATO standards. Again, Pifer made a persuasive case for Ukraine.  In his 
words: 
Ukraine has also made major progress on economic reform.  It reversed 
the decline that devastated the economy during the 1990s and has 
achieved eight consecutive years of economic growth.  Growth has 
averaged between six and seven percent per year, one of the most 
impressive growth rates in Europe or the former Soviet Union…Ukraine 
has put the basic institutions of a market economy in place and has begun 
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to draw substantial foreign investment.  The private sector now accounts 
for two-thirds of gross domestic product.  Ukraine’s trade patterns have 
increasingly oriented themselves toward European markets.196   
Ukraine also became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2008.   
However, despite its record of positive economic performance and significant 
reform, several issues loom within Ukraine’s economy that may cast doubt on its 
qualifications and readiness for a MAP in the eyes of some NATO Allies.  According to 
the 2008 Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom: 
Ukraine's economy is 51.1 percent free, according to our 2008 assessment, 
which makes it the world's 133rd freest economy. Its overall score is 0.6 
percentage point lower than last year. Ukraine is ranked 39th out of 41 
countries in the European region, and its overall score is much lower than 
the regional average…Ukraine is very weak in business freedom, 
government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, property rights, 
and freedom from corruption. Inflation is high, and government 
expenditures equal nearly two-fifths of GDP. While foreign investment is 
officially welcomed, corruption and regulations are deterrents to capital. 
The judiciary does not always enforce contracts and is tarnished with 
corruption. Corruption is a major problem throughout the civil service, and 
bureaucratic inefficiency makes many commercial operations 
difficult…Despite lucrative opportunities for foreign direct investment, 
economic progress in the near term may be slowed by persistent 
corruption, steadily increasing gas prices, deteriorating infrastructure, and 
political uncertainty.197 
Furthermore, Ukraine has been criticized by prominent world banking institutions 
for its slow progress in key areas of economic reform. According to the website of The 
Fund for Peace, “Despite some reforms, Ukraine was still criticized by the IMF and 
World Bank for not speeding the pace of structural reforms aimed at reducing its shadow 
economy and encouraging more foreign direct investment.”198  It appears that Ukraine 
may require more time to implement key economic reforms.   
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Another aspect of Ukraine’s economy that may negatively affect its NATO 
aspiration is its debt to Russia.  Ukraine’s debt to Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas 
company, has consistently been around $1 billion per year.199  Some experts believe that 
Russian leaders may use the debt to influence Ukrainian political leaders, and ultimately 
to block Ukraine’s NATO aspirations.  As noted previously, Roman Kupchinsky, a 
Eurasian affairs analyst for the Jamestown Foundation, stated: 
Gazprom and the Kremlin might be tempted to play the “gas card” in 
order to see Yanukovych elected and to gain control — if not direct 
ownership — of the Ukrainian trunk gas pipeline, a long-time objective of 
Russian policy…With a possible debt of over $10 billion by late 2009, the 
new Ukrainian government might be forced to sell the pipeline to 
Gazprom — as well as a substantial part of its industrial base, maintain the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and renounce its intention to join 
NATO.200 
At the December 2008 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, the NATO Allies will 
probably take the ability of Ukraine to meet Euro-Atlantic economic standards into 
consideration when deciding whether to award Ukraine MAP status. If economic 
progress has not been made since the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, it may negatively 
affect Ukraine’s NATO MAP aspiration.  
Finally, Pifer also stated that during the application process, NATO Allies 
examine an aspiring country’s ability to reform to meet NATO military and security 
standards.  NATO is an alliance of countries that provide for their own collective defense 
and undertake operations in support of collective security.   According to some experts, 
military and security reform could be the strongest areas in Ukraine’s NATO membership 
portfolio.  In Pifer’s words: 
Ukraine likewise has made important strides in restructuring its military, 
moving from a large, Soviet-style army in 1991 to a much smaller, more 
mobile force that increasingly is configured to meet Ukraine’s current 
security challenges and comply with NATO standards.  Over the past 15 
years, Ukrainian forces have acquired considerable experience in joint 
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operations with NATO and American forces…Furthermore, Ukraine has 
demonstrated that it has serious military capabilities and the political will 
to use them.  Ukrainian transport aircraft have provided strategic airlift to 
NATO forces…Ukrainian forces have participated alongside NATO and 
American troops in Balkan peacekeeping operations, such as in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. Ukraine deployed a chemical and biological weapons defense 
unit to Kuwait in 2003 and three battalions to Iraq in 2003-2005, making it 
at one point the fourth largest troop contributor to the coalition.  Ukraine’s 
military assets would make it a net contributor to Euro-Atlantic 
security.201 
Furthermore, in the areas of military and security reform, NATO Allies may also 
take note of various successful demilitarization projects in Ukraine. Several projects have 
been conducted in Ukraine through the Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, and these 
projects have helped Ukraine eliminate large stockpiles of surplus and obsolete 
munitions.  Grigoriy Perepelytsia described two such projects: 
A first project, launched in Donetsk in 2002 while Viktor Yanukovych 
was governor there, safely destroyed 400,000 anti-personnel landmines.  A 
second project – the largest single demilitarisation project of its kind in the 
world – aims to destroy 133,000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 
million small arms and light weapons, and 1,000 man-portable air defence 
systems over twelve years.202 
In sum, Ukraine has indicated to the NATO Allies that it has the motivation and 
capability to reform its military and security sectors to conform to NATO standards.   
However, some experts believe that the Ukrainian military establishment is not 
quite yet ready to be a NATO contributor.  According to a 2007 study by Marybeth 
Peterson Ulrich of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College: 
The Ukrainian armed forces have been on a starvation diet, recently 
receiving only 1.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).  Ukraine 
ranks…127th out of 150 countries worldwide in expenditure per 
serviceman.203   
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Furthermore, according to Natalie Mychajlyszyn, an assistant professor in the 
political science department at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada: 
Financial problems are at the heart of many of Ukraine’s problems with 
military reforms in general and the operationalization of its military 
doctrine and policy in particular…Moreover, without greater funding, 
professionalization of the military is delayed, prolonging dependence on 
inadequate and low quality conscripts…In sum, inadequate finances have 
resulted in low morale, a poorly prepared military force, and a low level of 
prestige, which ultimately hamper efforts to reform the military and to 
address the problems.204 
In fact, even Ukrainian citizens do not hold their military’s capabilities in the 
highest regard.  “A recent [September 2008] poll by the Ukrainian Strategic Studies 
Institute found that 57 percent of those polled did not believe that Ukraine was capable of 
defending its territorial integrity and independence by itself.”205 Furthermore, some 
Ukrainian experts are concerned about the future of the country’s military-industrial 
complex if Ukraine becomes a member of NATO. “Some Ukrainian politicians and 
economists are also worried that Ukrainian NATO accession could ruin or significantly 
damage the country’s military-industrial complex.  They argue that the country’s defense 
industries will become obsolete after the military switches to weapons and military 
technologies used by NATO troops.”206 
Another possible concern for NATO in the area of military and security reform is 
Ukraine’s civil-military relations.  According to Mychajlyszyn, in recent history, Ukraine 
has had a poor record of implementing democratic civil-military relations. She wrote as 
follows in 2002: 
While Ukraine’s commitment to peacekeeping is not in doubt, its progress 
in democratic civil-military relations is a significant priority for its PfP 
partners and those concerned with PKO [peacekeeping operations] who do 
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operate under a system of democratic civilian control…The lack of 
progress in democratic civil-military reforms threatens stronger 
coordination of defense planning with NATO and concrete projects in 
defense planning and training exercises.  It also weakens Ukraine’s 
reliability as a partner and a potential member of the alliance.207  
After the 2006 NATO Riga Summit, some NATO members believed that Ukraine 
needed to make further efforts to professionalize its armed forces and reform its security 
sector prior to obtaining NATO membership.208  Also, “Before the January 2008 letter 
by Ukraine’s top three leaders, U.S. officials warned…that Ukraine must continue 
defense reforms.”209  Military and security reform issues were not mentioned as 
prominent limiting factors for a Ukrainian MAP after the 2008 NATO Bucharest 
Summit.  Nevertheless, Ukrainian military and security reform efforts will most likely be 
considered in December 2008 at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, and any 
stagnation in progress may negatively affect Ukraine’s MAP application. 
B. POSSIBLE RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON NATO DECISION-MAKING   
As noted in Chapter III, Russian leaders are adamantly opposed to Ukraine 
gaining NATO membership.   As Paul Gallis of the Congressional Research Service has 
observed, “Russia has viewed the former Soviet republic as lying within its sphere of 
influence, in which Western countries and institutions should play little role.”210 
Furthermore, according to Pifer, “The Russians seek to draw a line between Europe and 
the former Soviet space.  Moscow wants Ukraine and Georgia on the eastern side of that 
line, and wants neither NATO nor the European Union to cross it.”211  Despite its  
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opposition, Russia is not a member of NATO.  Therefore, Russia does not have a veto on 
decisions made within NATO.  According to the Alliance’s official Study on NATO 
Enlargement: 
NATO’s enlargement must be understood as only one important element 
of a broad European security architecture that transcends and renders 
obsolete the idea of “dividing lines” in Europe…The Alliance should 
underline that there can be no question of “spheres of influence” in the 
contemporary Europe…NATO-Russia relations should reflect Russia’s 
significance in European security and be based on reciprocity, mutual 
respect and confidence…NATO decisions, however, cannot be subject to 
any veto or droit de regard by a non-member state.212 
In spite of such concrete statements, Russia may influence the decisions made by 
some NATO members.  Russian influence may in particular affect Ukraine’s NATO 
membership aspiration.  As noted previously, David Yost, a professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, wrote in 1998 that “Ukrainian accession to the Alliance is a distant 
prospect, because of a general Western reluctance to confront Russia in such a sensitive 
area.”213  Recent comments by NATO Allies seem to indicate that this situation has not 
changed.   
In April 2008, Francois Fillon, the Prime Minister of France, stated that “France 
will not give its green light to the entry of Ukraine and Georgia.  We are opposed to 
Georgia and Ukraine's entry because we think that it is not the correct response to the 
balance of power in Europe, and between Europe and Russia.”214 As noted previously in 
this chapter, “At the [March 2008] NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner and other European leaders stressed the need for maintaining 
good relations with Moscow.”215 More recently, in October 2008, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, 
France’s minister for European affairs, stated, “I think that it is not the right time for 
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membership for Georgia and Ukraine…It is not in the interest of Europe or its relations 
with Russia.”216  Furthermore, in October 2008, German Chancellor Angela Merkel held 
a joint press conference in St. Petersburg, Russia, with Russian President Vladimir 
Medvedev.  In response to a question from the Russian media about the possibility of 
NATO membership for Ukraine, Merkel made the following statement: 
As far as NATO membership for countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
is concerned, you named Georgia and Ukraine, and Germany’s position in 
this regard has not changed since the NATO summit in Bucharest.  We 
said then that countries can become NATO members if they wish. As far 
as the membership action plan itself is concerned, we took the view that 
the time was not yet ripe for this plan to go into effect.217 
In addition to such statements from European leaders, other experts have 
indicated that Ukraine was not offered a MAP at the Bucharest Summit due, in part, to 
Russian influence. As noted previously in this chapter, according to a study published by 
the Brookings Institution, “the possible Russian reaction” was one of three reasons cited 
for Ukraine’s failure to receive a MAP.218  According to Paul Gallis of the Congressional 
Research Service, “Key European NATO Allies were reluctant to consider a MAP for 
Ukraine at Bucharest…in part because they are concerned about damaging relations with 
Russia.”219  Furthermore, Steven Pifer stated, “Some will argue that, given Russian 
opposition, NATO should back away from Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for 
Ukraine and Georgia.”220  Karl-Heinz Kamp, research director of the NATO Defense 
College in Rome, stated that “Russia was not explicitly on the agenda at the NATO 
summit in Bucharest.  But Moscow’s views informed the debates on…NATO 
enlargement.”221  
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If Russia is not allowed a veto in NATO, then why does Russia seem to have an 
influence over the decisions made by some members of NATO regarding Ukrainian 
membership? According to Victor Mauer, the deputy director and head of research at the 
Center for Security Studies (CSS) in Zurich, Switzerland: 
Moscow knows that NATO is a guarantor of security at its western flank 
and that it benefits from the Alliance’s engagement on its weak southern 
flank in Afghanistan. It is precisely for this reason that Western Europeans 
are advocating a balancing act that aims to avoid further antagonism after 
the conflict over sovereignty for Kosovo, without giving the impression 
that Moscow can dictate NATO’s agenda from outside.222 
In addition, Karl-Heinz Kamp stated that “[T]here continue to be cracks in 
transatlantic structures [such as NATO] into which Russia might drive a wedge…There is 
no NATO policy toward Russia that is accepted by all members.”223  Collective defense 
and energy dependence are two possible “cracks” that Russia may be able to exploit 
within NATO. 
Regarding collective defense, the NATO Study on Enlargement stated: 
[T]he commitment by all Allies to defend one another’s territory has 
proven its value…as an anchor of stability and confidence in Europe.  This 
commitment has helped Allied countries develop powerful and flexible 
military capabilities, firmly under political control.  NATO’s reliance on 
collective defense has ensured that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its 
own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges.  
Sharing these benefits with new members can help extend security and 
stability in Europe.224 
Also, according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on one is 
considered an attack on all: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
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recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.225  
As noted in Chapter III, “On February 14, 2008, in response to a question about 
possible Ukrainian membership in NATO, President Putin warned that Russia might be 
forced to take military countermeasures, including aiming missiles at Ukraine, if Kiev 
hosted foreign bases or joined the U.S. missile defense project.”226  In August 2008, the 
Russian military invaded Georgia, a former Soviet republic seeking NATO membership.  
This prompted Richard Holbrooke, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, to say that 
“[Prime Minister] Putin’s next target will be Ukraine.”227   
The possibility of Russian “military countermeasures” against Ukraine, combined 
with the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, may play a major role in the Allied 
decision on whether to offer Ukraine a MAP.  In light of these issues, some members of 
the Alliance may be hesitant to offer Ukraine a MAP and eventual membership.  
According to George Friedman, chief intelligence officer for Stratfor, a private 
intelligence company, Germany is one such member: 
Germany views…NATO expansion [to Ukraine and Georgia] as simply 
not in Germany’s interests.  First, expanding NATO guarantees to Ukraine 
and Georgia is meaningless.  NATO and the United States don’t have the 
military means to protect Ukraine or Georgia, and incorporating them into 
the alliance would not increase European security.  From a military 
standpoint, NATO membership for the two former Soviet republics is an 
empty gesture, while from a political standpoint, Berlin sees it as designed 
to irritate the Russians for no clear purpose.  Next, were NATO prepared 
to protect Ukraine and Georgia, all NATO countries including Germany 
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would be forced to increase defense expenditures substantially.  This is not 
something that Germany and the rest of NATO want to do.228 
Furthermore, some experts hold that providing security guarantees for Ukraine vis 
à vis Russia may pose grave risks to NATO military forces.  R. Craig Nation, director of 
Eurasian and Russian studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
assessed the risks associated with providing such a guarantee as follows: 
Meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine can only be provided by 
NATO, but there will be serious political and operational constraints to 
any large-scale use of Alliance forces in the Eurasian steppe.  Moscow has 
committed itself to a national military strategy that emphasizes reliance 
upon tactical nuclear weapons in a phase of conventional weakness.  
Assertive military commitments in areas immediately contiguous to the 
Russian border will therefore pose considerable risk.  Moscow is willing 
and able to assert meaningful pressure in close proximity to its frontiers, 
and in the central European corridor it can be counted upon to do so if 
vital interests are perceived to be at stake.229 
Such Russian vital interests could involve Sevastopol, the home of the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet (RBSF).  According to an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, the 
RBSF will be stationed in Sevastopol until 2017.  Some NATO Allies may consider the 
presence of a Russian naval base on Ukrainian territory a reason not to extend 
membership to Ukraine. As noted previously, according to Steve Larrabee of the Rand 
Corporation, “As long as the [Russian] fleet is there [in Sevastopol], there’s little 
likelihood that NATO would bring Ukraine into the alliance…Most of the [NATO] 
members would be afraid to bring Ukraine there with the Russian presence on Ukrainian 
soil.”230  Another Russian “vital” interest could involve the Russian population located in 
Crimea.  “Estimates of the number of Russian passport holders in the Crime range from a 
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low of 6,000 (Newsweek, August 23) to 100,000 (Los Angeles Times, August 25).”231 A 
fear among some Ukrainians is that Russia could use the presence of a significant number 
of Russian citizens on Ukrainian territory as a pretext for war.  “Our Ukraine-Self 
Defense deputy Volodymyr Stretovych warned that increasing the number of Russian 
citizens in the Crimea would give Russia, as in Georgia, a pretext to come to the 
‘defense’ of its citizens.”232  It is noteworthy in this regard that Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev has stated that Russia will protect its citizens “wherever they are.”233 
In addition to Ukraine’s energy dependence, which was discussed previously, its 
economy is heavily dependent on Russia.  Russia is Ukraine’s top trading partner, 
accounting for 25.2 percent of Ukraine’s imports and 21.7 percent of its exports in 
2007.234  Therefore, Russia has a significant stake and influence in Ukraine’s economy.  
Offering NATO membership to Ukraine could result in Russia negatively exploiting the 
extensive economic ties between the two countries.  In light of such threats, NATO Allies 
may have to be prepared to provide substantial assistance to Ukraine.  Some NATO 
members may be unwilling to provide such assistance.  According to Gallis, “In any case, 
Russian ability and desire to ‘punish’ Ukraine politically and economically could exceed 
the ability and willingness of many NATO states to respond.”235 
The other possible “crack” in NATO that Russia may exploit, in addition to the 
collective defense guarantee, involves energy dependence.  Several European NATO 
countries rely extensively on Russian natural gas and oil.  In 2007, Marshall Goldman, a 
professor of Russian economics at Wellesley College, described Europe’s dependence on 
Russia as follows: 
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Overall, Russia today is the source of about 23 percent of Europe’s natural 
gas imports.  There are alternative sources of supply in the North Sea (60 
percent of Europe’s imports) and Algeria (10 percent of Europe’s 
imports), but production, particularly in the North Sea, is declining and 
there is virtually no excess capacity that can be called on if the flow from 
Russia is disrupted.  As a consequence, Russian gas supplies are critical to 
the economic and personal well-being of a surprising number of countries, 
not only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but in a growing 
number of Western European countries…Russia now has as much 
influence over natural gas consumers in Europe as the combined 
membership of OPEC has over users of crude oil; by unabashedly 
manipulating its gas pipeline monopoly, Russia has become the OPEC of 
the natural gas world, at least in Europe…Russia has also become an 
important supplier of petroleum to its neighbors in Europe…Should it 
choose to, Russia can still exercise significant leverage over its petroleum 
customers.236 
The exploitation of energy dependence as a source of geopolitical leverage is 
consistent with official Russian policy.  As noted in Chapter III, “The first paragraph of 
the official (2003) Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 defines the 
country’s fuel and energy complex as an ‘instrument for the conduct of internal and 
external policy’, adding that ‘the role of the country in world energy markets to a large 
extent determines its geopolitical influence’.”237  
European dependence on Russian energy is expected to increase over the years.  
“In one estimate, by 2030 EU countries will import 40 percent of their gas needs from 
Russia.”238  Furthermore, competition for energy supplies will become a factor, due to 
the rising consumption throughout Europe.  “Forecasters predict that natural gas 
consumption in the EU will double over the next 25 years, and gas has rapidly become 
Europe’s fuel of choice for power generation.”239  Most EU countries are also members 
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of NATO.  Specific European NATO countries that are heavily dependent on Russian 
energy include France, Germany and Italy.  According to Goldman: 
Of all the EU countries, Germany has become the most dependent on 
Russian natural gas.  It imports about 36 billion cubic meters of Russian 
gas annually.  Not only does that constitute a little more than 40 percent of 
Germany’s gas imports, it is a larger quantity than that bought by any 
other country…Even Italy and France rely on Russia for around 30 
percent of their gas…Just as is the case with natural gas, Germany imports 
over 40 percent of its crude oil from Russia.240 
Given this dependence, Russia may be able to influence decisions made by 
European leaders.  Specifically, Russia may be able to influence Germany’s decision on 
Ukraine’s NATO MAP application.  Russian leaders are adamantly opposed to Ukraine’s 
NATO membership aspiration.  William Drozdiak, the President of the American 
Council on Germany in New York City, has described the geopolitical influence Russia 
may have over Germany’s decision-making: 
For Germany and other European countries, Russia’s role as key supplier 
of oil and gas makes Putin a vital strategic partner who cannot be ignored 
or antagonized.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel…has tempered her 
stance and recognized that she has no other choice than to embrace Putin.  
Germany is Europe’s biggest importer of Russian gas, and its dependency 
on it will rise if Germany carries out plans to phase out its nuclear power 
plants by 2020.241 
As noted previously in this chapter, in October 2008, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel stated that Germany’s stance on Ukraine’s MAP application had not changed 
since the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit.  This statement was made in St. 
Petersburg, Russia, during a joint press conference with Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev.  George Friedman, the chief intelligence officer for Stratfor, believes 
Germany’s dependence on Russian energy played a role in Merkel’s decision.  In 
Friedman’s words: 
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In one sense, Merkel’s reasons for her stance are simple.  Germany is 
heavily dependent on Russian natural gas.  If the supply were cut off, 
Germany’s situation would be desperate — or at least close enough that 
the distinction would be academic.  Russia might decide it could not 
afford to cut off natural gas exports, but Merkel is dealing with a 
fundamental German interest, and risking that for Ukrainian or Georgian 
membership in NATO is not something she is prepared to do.242  
Furthermore, Italy has been characterized by some as bowing to Russian 
influence.  In reference to Italy’s energy dependence on Russia, an unidentified diplomat 
from a former Soviet satellite reportedly stated that, “Italy is Russia’s Trojan horse in 
Europe.”243  
Some European countries and leaders recognize the growing energy dependence 
on Russia, and the dangers associated with it.  “In a July 2006 speech, Romania’s 
President [Traian] Basescu went so far as to warn that ‘Europe’s dependence on Russian 
gas monopoly Gazprom…could be the biggest threat to the region since the former 
Soviet Union’s army.”244   
There have been calls for European countries to diversify their energy imports, 
and become less dependent on Russian supplies.  According to Paul Belkin of the 
Congressional Research Service, “Europe’s growing dependence on Russia and Russia’s 
apparent willingness to use its energy resources for political purposes have spurred calls 
from some member states and the United States for a more cohesive EU-wide strategy to 
further diversify supply.”245  However, Russia has reacted harshly to any talk of limiting 
its business in Europe.  In 2006, in a meeting with EU Ambassadors, then Gazprom CEO 
Alexei Miller stated: 
It is necessary to note that attempts to limit Gazprom’s activities in the 
European market and politicize questions of gas supply, which in fact are 
of an entirely economic nature, will not lead to good results…It should not 
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be forgotten that we [Gazprom] are actively familiarizing ourselves with 
new markets, such as North America and China.246 
Despite calls to diversify, and in light of comments such as those made by Alexei 
Miller, “several [EU] member states have pursued bilateral energy deals with Russia that 
will increase their dependence on Russia for years to come.  Both Germany and Italy, the 
largest importers of Russian gas, have negotiated long-term deals with Russia to lock in 
future gas supplies.”247  Some European nations, specifically Poland and the Baltic 
states, have criticized these bilateral deals.  “They have warned their European colleagues 
not to make energy deals that will give Russia an undue and possibly dangerous amount 
of political influence over European decision-making.”248  Such deals may enable Russia 
to have a voice in European decision-making in the near future, specifically the decision 
whether to give Ukraine a NATO MAP.  Furthermore, Russian influence on the decision-
making of NATO members may extend beyond Europe.  According to an article 
published in The Economist in September 2008: 
It is not just that European countries blocked the…plan to give Ukraine 
and Georgia a clear path to potential membership at the alliance’s summit 
in April.  Turkey, the most important NATO member in the Black Sea 
region, is torn between the competing claims of strategic partnership with 
America and its strong trading links with Russia (which supplies most of 
its gas)…Turkey is pushing its own regional initiative.249 
In sum, Moscow will likely maintain its opposition to Ukrainian membership in 
NATO.  Russian leaders will continue to use zero-sum logic when thinking of an 
independent Ukraine in NATO.  Officially, Russia does not have a veto on NATO 
member decisions, because it is not a member of NATO.  However, unofficially, R. Craig 
Nation has argued, “NATO’s role in the new Eurasia will be limited by the need to 
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sustain cooperative relations with the Russian Federation.”250  Some members of NATO 
may not be prepared to provoke Russia on such a sensitive issue, while some NATO 
members may be looking after their own energy security.     
In conclusion, NATO foreign ministers will review Ukraine’s status in December 
2008.  They will determine if Ukraine is ready to receive a MAP.  They will most likely 
base their determination on several factors, including Ukraine’s political situation, 
economic reform, military and security reform, and public opinion polls.  The NATO 
Allies made clear at the Bucharest summit that Ukraine would become a member of 
NATO.  As was noted previously, they stated in the Bucharest Summit Declaration, “We 
agreed today that these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of 
NATO.”251  However, no timetable was given for this membership.  President 
Yushchenko reportedly remains optimistic about Ukraine’s MAP application and 
eventual membership in NATO.  However, as recently as October 2008, some European 
leaders indicated that Ukraine will not receive a MAP at the December 2008 meeting of 
NATO foreign ministers.  While Ukraine’s readiness for membership has been cited as a 
potential limitation, Russian opposition may also be a factor in future decisions on 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO is limited by several factors, 
internal and external to Ukraine.  The internal factors within Ukraine include an overall 
negative public perception of NATO, and a volatile domestic political landscape. The 
external factors include Russian influence, and the competing views among NATO 
members.  This conclusion reviews these factors, and offers recommendations to improve 
Ukraine’s prospects for a NATO MAP and eventual membership in the Alliance. 
Anti-NATO public opinion within Ukraine continues to be one of the main 
limiting internal factors for its NATO membership aspiration.  As recently as May 2008, 
a public opinion poll conducted by Sofia, a Kyiv-based think tank, showed that only 21.4 
percent of the Ukrainians polled support NATO membership for Ukraine.  In addition, 53 
percent of those polled approved of the decision made by NATO not to offer Ukraine a 
MAP at the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit.252  In addition:   
The poll identified the main reasons for the negative attitude to NATO 
membership.  Most Ukrainians fear that this would spoil relations with 
Russia (74 percent of those polled), force them to take part in US-led wars 
(67 percent), exacerbate tension in society (60 percent), prompt more 
spending on defense (58 percent), and make Ukraine a target for terrorists 
(58 percent).253  
Furthermore, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted a poll 
in August and September 2008, in which Ukrainian citizens were asked which military 
security option would be the best for Ukraine.  “While only 17.4 percent said joining 
NATO, 28.3 percent chose ‘joining a military union with Russia’ (25 percent opted for 
not joining any bloc and 10.8 percent for a new EU-member-only system of collective 
security).”254   
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There is another disturbing trend for Ukrainian NATO proponents.  Not only is 
Ukrainian support for NATO membership geographically based, as noted in Chapter II, 
but noteworthy proportions of the opposition to NATO membership appear to be from 
the younger generation within Ukraine.  In August 2008, the Taylor Nelson Sofrez 
Ukraine agency conducted a public opinion poll of 1,200 Ukrainians.  “Overall, 63 
percent of those polled by Taylor Nelson were opposed to Ukraine joining NATO.  Only 
3.3 percent were undecided.  Some 65 percent of NATO opponents were 60 or more 
years old.”255  However, when younger respondents (18-19 years old) were asked their 
opinion of NATO, “only 23 percent in this age group agreed that Ukraine should join the 
Alliance.”256   
Therefore, increasing public support for Ukrainian membership in NATO will 
require a plan that addresses various elements of the population.  Also, the plan should 
address the fears expressed by Ukrainians about NATO membership, as noted in the 
polls.  The Ukrainian government, with NATO assistance, has developed a plan to 
improve Ukrainian public opinion of NATO.  As noted previously, Article 4 of the 2006 
NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan instituted various statewide programs, conferences, 
and workshops to educate the public on the purposes of NATO.  Furthermore, the Target 
Plan instituted semi-annual polling to determine common misperceptions of NATO, and 
called for recommendations designed to address these misperceptions.  In addition to this 
plan, the Ukrainian government approved another public awareness campaign in May 
2008 to improve NATO’s image.  According to Pavel Korduban: 
On May 28 the Ukrainian government approved a four-year, $6 million 
public awareness plan aimed at winning majority support among the 
population for NATO accession.  According to the plan, public support for 
NATO entry should grow to 36 percent by the end of 2008 and further to 
43 percent in 2009, 50 percent in 2010, and 55 percent by 2011.  The plan 
provides for a set of measures ranging from establishing a network of 
NATO information offices across the country to printing posters, 
calendars and brochures; launching mandatory NATO awareness courses 
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at schools; organizing soccer matches between teams from Ukraine and 
NATO member states; and inviting DJs [disc jockeys] from NATO 
countries to Ukrainian nightclubs.  The nationwide pro-NATO campaign 
started with an event featuring pop stars in Ukraina Palace in downtown 
Kyiv…[Furthermore] the NU [Yushchenko’s political party] organized 
pro-NATO rallies in the southern cities of Odessa, Mykolaiv, Sevastopol, 
and Simferopol.257  
Therefore, the Yushchenko government is dedicating substantial resources to 
combat misperceptions about NATO among the Ukrainian population, across the 
geographical and generational spheres.  However, in addition to improving public 
awareness and combating misperceptions of NATO, the Yushchenko government should 
emphasize the benefits that ongoing cooperation with NATO has already brought to 
Ukraine, along with the potential benefits that Ukraine would gain from membership in 
NATO.  Perepelytsia provided some specific examples of ongoing cooperation: 
Since 1994, NATO and individual Allies have provided professional 
military training to some 8,500 Ukrainian officers.  Moreover, between 
2001 and 2006, NATO has supported the retraining of over 3,000 retired 
Ukrainian military personnel to help their transition to civilian life.  Since 
2006, new professional courses have been launched for former military 
personnel in Kirovohrad, Melitopol, Chernihiv and Lviv.  And language 
courses are ongoing in Odessa, Kyiv and Simferopol.258 
Furthermore, Perepelytsia pointed out that the Ukrainian government could 
highlight the various demilitarization projects ongoing in Ukraine, through the NATO 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund.  As noted previously, these projects include 
efforts to reduce and eliminate huge stockpiles of obsolete and surplus munitions that 
pose a risk to the population.259  In addition, John Kriendler has noted some potential 
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Key benefits would include, collective defence guarantees, defence at 
lower cost, participation in cooperative security arrangements, decision 
making in NATO, impetus to reform, seeking EU membership, 
strengthening Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis Russia and increased economic 
growth and foreign direct investment.260 
Highlighting the potential benefits, along with the benefits received from ongoing 
cooperation with NATO, might increase public support for Alliance membership 
throughout Ukraine and help transform common stereotypes and misperceptions.  This 
would represent success for the plans instituted by the Yushchenko government to 
educate the Ukrainian population about NATO.   
However, political uncertainties in Ukraine may undermine efforts to improve 
public understanding of NATO, and ultimately may hinder Ukraine’s efforts to join 
NATO.  As noted in Chapter IV, Yushchenko’s popularity is in significant decline among 
Ukrainians.  An October 2008 poll in Ukraine confirmed Yushchenko’s loss of 
legitimacy among the Ukrainian people:  
According to the results of a recent sociological poll, which was 
conducted by the “Ukrainian Democratic Kolo” for the Institute of 
Politics, Ukrainians have less confidence in their president Viktor 
Yushchenko than in other politicians.  Only 13.6 percent of citizens trust 
the president, while 70.5 percent do not.  V. Yushchenko has the worst 
balance between confidence and lack of confidence – equaling 59 
percent261 
Furthermore, political infighting regarding NATO membership has hindered the 
pursuit of Ukraine’s NATO aspiration.  President Yushchenko has been seeking NATO 
membership for Ukraine since his election in 2004.  However, there are influential 
political leaders that do not agree with him.  Former Prime Minister Yanukovych is not a 
proponent of NATO membership, particularly without holding a public referendum that 
approves of it.  Yanukovych is the leader of the Party of Regions (PR).  Prior to 
Yushchenko’s dismissal of the Ukrainian parliament in October 2008, the PR held the 
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largest number of seats.  With parliamentary elections slated for December 2008, the PR 
is in a position to gain even more seats in the Ukrainian parliament, giving the party more 
leverage over Ukraine’s NATO aspiration.  Without the support of Yanukovych and his 
party, the quest for NATO membership for Ukraine will continue to be problematic.  
According to Taras Kuzio:  
Without the PR supporting Ukraine’s NATO membership, it would be 
difficult for Ukraine to join NATO, as the PR dominates eastern-southern 
Ukraine, where NATO membership is most unpopular.262 
Furthermore, policy disagreements between President Yushchenko and Prime 
Minister Tymoshenko have hampered Ukraine’s efforts to join NATO.  Infighting over 
domestic and international issues is conveying the impression to the Ukrainian people, 
and to NATO, that Ukraine is politically unstable.  Critical observers maintain that the 
dissolution of the Ukrainian parliament in October 2008 has further eroded democracy in 
Ukraine.   
In summation, NATO membership will probably remain a highly politicized issue 
in Ukraine for years to come.  If Ukraine is to be considered for NATO membership, the 
political infighting should be resolved.  According to Steven Pifer, “Ukraine is weaker, 
not just on securing a MAP but on a whole range of questions, when the president and 
prime minister are undermining each other.  The current turmoil and immature politics 
create for some a justification to say that Ukraine is not ready for a MAP.”263  A unified 
Ukrainian government and the domestic political will to move forward with NATO 
membership would be key additions to Ukraine’s NATO membership portfolio.  Anatoliy 
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Ukraine has not lost its chance to move forward and join the 
Alliance…How long it will take, depends, first of all, on the level of 
coordination of our authorities.  Second, it depends on our desire to build a 
country that meets NATO standards.  And third, it depends on the will and 
determination of key political players in our country to support NATO 
accession.264   
Russian influence is an external factor limiting the prospects for Ukraine’s NATO 
aspiration.  Historically, Russian policies have subjugated Ukraine in the political, social 
and economic realms.  These subjugation tendencies have influenced some Ukrainians to 
seek integration with the West, through institutions such as NATO.  However, Russia’s 
leaders believe that Ukraine lies within its sphere of influence, and adamantly oppose 
NATO membership.  Furthermore, Russia still has the leverage to influence decision-
making on Ukraine’s NATO aspiration with social, political and economic resources.   
Ukraine should develop measures to counter any Russian attempts to influence its 
foreign policy.  Steven Pifer has offered recommendations on how Ukraine can achieve 
this.  In addition to the Ukrainian government pursuing a coherent and consistent foreign 
policy, and conducting public education campaigns on NATO, Pifer concluded that: 
[T]he government should reduce vulnerabilities to Russian pressure.  This 
means paying energy debts on time, so that Moscow has no pretext for 
reducing the flow of gas.  It means energy conservation and developing 
domestic gas and oil resources in order to enhance Ukraine’s energy 
security.  And it means managing the gas transit system in an open and 
transparent manner.  A Ukraine that strengthens its own energy-security 
situation and serves as a reliable and transparent transporter of energy to 
Europe will reduce its exposure to Russian energy pressures and can 
become an indispensable part of Europe’s energy future…Russia has 
exploited the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to 
destabilize Georgia.  While the Georgian and Ukrainian situations are 
different, the Ukrainian government should keep a close watch to make 
sure Russia does not use the language or ethnic issues to create pressure 
points, especially in Crimea.  One potential pressure point is the Black Sea 
Fleet.  Ukraine has the right, as a sovereign country, to insist on the fleet’s 
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with Moscow the activities of warships operating from Ukrainian ports.  
But perhaps now may not be the time to try to accelerate negotiations on 
the fleet’s departure.  Ukraine can be pro-European and still try to 
maintain good relations with Russia.265   
Ukraine is actively pursuing nuclear power as a step towards energy 
independence from Russia.  The government has located significant uranium ore deposits 
in Ukraine, which will fuel nuclear power plants.  Ukraine may have enough uranium ore 
deposits to satisfy 100 percent of its nuclear power needs.  According to Prime Minister 
Tymoshenko, uranium ore extraction is the beginning of the country’s autonomous 
nuclear-fuel cycle.266  In her words, “This will guarantee energy independence of the 
state.”267  However, the transition from natural gas to nuclear power will require several 
years.  Therefore, Ukraine will continue to rely on Russian natural gas imports for years 
to come.  Furthermore, Ukraine is heavily reliant on Russia in other areas of the 
economy.  As noted previously, Russia is Ukraine’s top trading partner, accounting for 
25.2 percent of Ukraine’s imports and 21.7 percent of its exports in 2007.268  Russia may 
attempt to use energy and economic interdependence as a tool to influence Ukrainian 
politics and Ukrainian foreign policy in the near future. 
Regarding Crimea, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the numerous Russian 
passport holders there will ensure the region’s explosive nature for years to come.  
Keeping a close eye on Crimea, as Pifer has recommended, will not stop Russian leaders 
from exploiting the volatility of this region.  In May 2008, Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of 
Moscow, flew to Crimea to give a speech. Luzhkov, along with many other Russian 
leaders and citizens, believes that Crimea belongs to Russia.  “He proclaimed in a speech 
that Sevastopol, the site of the Russian naval base, belongs to Russia.  ‘Is it right for us to 
 
265 Steven Pifer, “South Ossetia Conflict Holds Lessons for Kyiv,” Brookings Institution, 11 
September 2008. Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0815_Ukraine_pifer.aspx 
(accessed 11 September 2008). 
266 Government of Ukraine, “Yulia Tymoshenko: Initiating uranium ore extraction is a step toward 
energy independence,” Web Portal of Ukrainian Government, Available from 
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=154717874 (accessed 28 August 2008).  
267 Ibid. 
268 “The 2007 CIA World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, Available from 
https://www.cia.gov (accessed 14 October 2008). 
  82
                                                
keep silent?’ he said. ‘We are speaking the truth.’”269  In addition, “In Sevastopol…Mr. 
Luzhkov has deepened the Russian presence. He has constructed a branch of Moscow 
State University, Russian Orthodox cathedrals, schools, a sports complex and other 
facilities.”270  Luzhkov has also donated money for the construction of military housing 
for Russian military members stationed in Sevastopol.   
Therefore, Ukraine can expect Russia to continue to use social, economic and 
political pressure to influence the prospects for its NATO membership aspiration.  As 
Pifer recommended, the Ukrainian government should attempt to maintain good relations 
with its Russian neighbor.  In regard to NATO, “For its part, the Ukrainian government 
should continue to make clear to Moscow that its motivation for seeking to draw closer to 
NATO is Euro-Atlantic integration, not anti-Russian [sentiment].”271  However, Ukraine 
does not have to appease Russia by bowing to its anti-NATO pressure.  Ukraine is a 
sovereign country, with a right to choose its own foreign policy.  It is ultimately up to the 
Ukrainian leaders and citizens to choose whether to resist and overcome any Russian 
anti-NATO influence.  In the words of Pifer: 
Russia is playing a serious game with regard to the former Soviet space.  
Kyiv needs to respond with equal seriousness.  A serious Ukrainian 
response—a coherent government, growing public support for a pro-
European course, and addressing vulnerabilities in the Ukraine-Russia 
relationship – will strengthen Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russian 
pressure.  It likewise will have a positive effect on how the West and 
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This leads to the other external factor limiting the prospects for Ukraine’s NATO 
membership aspiration: the possible decisions of the NATO Allies. Some members of 
NATO do not believe that Ukraine is ready for a MAP, while others evidently do not 
wish to damage relations with Russia.   
To determine Ukraine’s readiness, reforms within the political, social, military, 
and security areas will be analyzed in December 2008 by the NATO foreign ministers.  In 
particular, public opinion polls and political developments within and beyond Ukraine 
have received much attention from NATO officials and members.   
Public opinion polls within Ukraine have been, and continue to be, an important 
issue within NATO regarding Ukraine’s membership aspiration.  Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 
Secretary General of NATO, has stressed the importance that NATO places on Ukrainian 
public opinion.  In 2005, he stated, “[I]t will ultimately be up to you, the people of 
Ukraine, and her current and future leaders, to carry this conversation forward.  Because 
the fundamental decisions about Ukraine’s future are decisions that you will have to 
take.”273  In February 2008, he made the following statements: “Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian people…at a certain stage, decide if they want NATO, because as we know, in 
Ukrainian public opinion there’s still something to be done…to increase public support 
for NATO.”274  Misperceptions of NATO within Ukraine will require time to change.  
Anti-NATO public opinion polls will most likely remain unchanged in the near future, 
and may limit Ukraine’s readiness for membership in the eyes of some NATO members.  
Therefore, proponents of NATO membership in Ukraine should remain patient, and trust 
that the various public awareness campaigns will address Ukrainian misperceptions of 
NATO. 
Ukrainian political uncertainty has also received high visibility within NATO, and 
it may affect judgments about Ukraine’s readiness for membership.  According to Steven 
Pifer: 
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Political turmoil in Ukraine complicates Kyiv’s bid.  President 
Yushchenko in October [2008] dissolved the parliament and has called for 
pre-term parliamentary elections.  While Prime Minister Tymoshenko 
opposes elections, the odds are that, when NATO foreign ministers meet 
December 2-3 [2008], Ukraine will be in the run-up to elections.  That 
means that NATO ministers will not know who will be the next prime 
minister, let alone whether he or she will support Yushchenko’s desire for 
a MAP.275    
Andrew Wilson, an expert on Ukrainian affairs at the European Council for 
Foreign Relations, also discussed the possible impact of Ukraine’s political situation on 
NATO’s view of Ukraine’s readiness for membership: 
Andrew Wilson…put the likelihood of a MAP invitation in December 
[2008] at virtually nil.  “There is a slight chance that some NATO 
members would offer Yushchenko something for domestic political 
purposes”…But with the president’s political numbers running so low, 
Wilson thought NATO leaders would probably find it inadvisable to bet 
on the president in such a manner.276 
Ongoing political uncertainty within Ukraine may be cited to justify a decision by 
the Allies not to offer Ukraine a MAP in December 2008.  Therefore, for NATO 
membership to become a realistic possibility, the Ukrainian government’s leaders should 
end their infighting and become more unified.  According to Pifer: 
First and foremost, it is not the time for a divided government.  President 
Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko must end their 
infighting and together pursue a coherent policy.  The government should 
also talk to the Party of Regions.  Leaders of that party may one day be 
back in power.  They should share the government’s interest in protecting 
Ukraine’s right to set its own foreign-policy course.277  
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Russian pressures may also influence the decision making of some NATO 
members.  Officially, Russia does not have a veto on any decision made by NATO, 
because Russia is not a member of the Alliance.  The Study on NATO Enlargement 
specifically states that “NATO’s decisions…cannot be subject to any veto or droit de 
regard by a non-member state.278  Furthermore, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer confirmed this at a February 2008 NATO-Ukraine Commission press 
conference. In response to a question about Russian influence on NATO enlargement, he 
stated firmly, “NATO decisions are taken by the allies.”279 
However, in spite of the fact that Russia is not officially allowed a vote in NATO 
decision-making, Russia may attempt to influence the decisions made by NATO 
members.  If Ukraine was offered NATO membership, significant economic and security 
guarantees might be required to protect Ukraine against Russian “countermeasures.” The 
costs and risks associated with these guarantees may deter some countries from 
approving Ukraine’s NATO bid.  Furthermore, European energy dependence on Russia 
may also affect NATO decision making.  Several European countries import significant 
amounts of Russian natural gas and oil. Additionally, Germany and other European 
NATO countries have struck long-term, bilateral energy deals with Russia.  According to 
The Economist, such deals pose risks for NATO decision-making: 
As long as governments like Germany’s prefer to cut separate deals with 
Russia, Europe’s inevitable dependence on Russian oil and gas will 
always offer a tempting way for an opportunistic Kremlin to exert pressure 
on this country or that, by turning off the taps.280  
These factors may enable Russia to have a voice in NATO decision-making for 
years to come, including the decision on whether to give Ukraine a MAP.  France’s 
Prime Minister, Francois Fillon, confirmed this view when he stated in April 2008 that, 
“France will not give its green light to the entry of Ukraine and Georgia.  We are opposed 
to Georgia and Ukraine's entry because we think that it is not the correct response to the 
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balance of power in Europe, and between Europe and Russia.”281 Apparently, the 
balance of power is now a consideration in determining the status of a country’s NATO 
bid.  NATO should take into account Russian views, but allowing Russia to influence the 
Alliance’s decision-making would be a mistake.  According to Pifer: 
While the Alliance should not ignore Russian views, concern in Russia 
should not mean compromising another nation’s aspiration to associate 
with an alliance of shared values that promotes stability and security 
throughout Europe.  It would be a mistake to allow Russia a veto over the 
extension of MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia.  To do so would be to accept 
a new dividing line between Europe and the former Soviet space.  It would 
deny the opportunity to tens of millions to become full members of the 
Euro-Atlantic community.  And it would encourage those in Russia who 
wish to reassert a Russian-led post-Soviet bloc rather than develop a 
relationship of cooperation and full partnership with Europe and the West.  
These effects would not be in the interest of the United States, of the 
Alliance or, ultimately, of Russia.282 
In conclusion, despite the Russian issue within NATO, Ukraine should focus on 
what it has control of.  It should resolve its political uncertainties and continue with its 
NATO education campaign to improve the public’s opinion of the Alliance.  Further 
reform efforts in the economic, political, military, and security realms should continue in 
cooperation with NATO.  According to the NATO Secretary General: 
Do not forget that this process is performance-driven.  It is driven by 
performance.  It is driven by reforms, as we are discussing at the moment…Ukraine is an 
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Therefore, as Pifer has suggested, “Ukraine’s representative in Brussels should 
ask NATO ambassadors to state exactly what the outstanding questions are, and Kyiv 
should then address them as a matter of priority.”284  Ukraine should continue to address 
any shortcomings or concerns that may encourage NATO members to postpone decisions 
on its MAP application and quest for NATO membership.  In the end, NATO 
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